The extreme right in Sweden and France

Résumé du document

In 2002, elections were hold in both Sweden and France. When it comes to voting, many differences exist between the two countries (e.g.: proportional voting vs. majority). But even if those institutional differences remain important, in that very special year the most striking feature was undoubtedly the opposite fate of the extreme right. While in the French presidential elections the extreme right (mostly the national front) gathered 20% of the votes, the Swedish extreme right (Sweden Democrats + New Democracy) seduced only 1.5% of the voters! Obviously, it is not possible to deduce a general rule about the extreme right on the only basis of 2002, which has been (at least in France) a very peculiar year. However, it really seems that while the French extreme right can from times to times play a key role on the political scene, the Swedish is kept in silence by several factors. Why has the Swedish extreme right always been so weak while in France and in most of Europe far right ideals have been rising since the 1980's? What are the political and sociological features that have kept the Swedish far right so low? And is the current rise of Sweden Democrats in the opinion polls due to the weakening of those features?

Extraits

[...] To a very large extent, the success of the National Front is due to the personality of its leader, Jean Marie le Pen. Born in 1928, he was elected MP in 1956. In 1972, he created the National Front and is its leader since the beginning. His personality has kept the party and the electorate as one for more than thirty years! The secession of his former right hand man Bruno Mégret did not affect the party. The perspective of his retirement is currently bringing on a crisis both in the leadership and in the electorate. [...]

[...] When it comes to methodology, I've chosen to use the outcome of the general elections in Sweden and the presidential elections in France. I've voluntarily put aside French legislative and local elections because the mode of scrutiny and the obsession of “vote utile” (literally “useful voting”, quite a strange concept!) dramatically underestimate the actual strength of non-traditional parties. An institutional approach Most of the features of the Swedish model contribute to the weakness of the extreme right, but as I'll try to show, electoral behavior and parties' strategies are the main explanations and are far more relevant than institutional factors. [...]

[...] All except for one: the National Front. As a result, the National Front is the only party who did not have to cope with the exercise of power which may result in a loose of credibility (in Sweden New Democracy disappeared after just one legislature). Besides, the national front is thus seen as the only anti- system party. Researchers have pointed out that the extremist vote is often a vote “against” rather than a vote of full adhesion, in France if one wants to shows his anger at the political system, one will vote for the National Front. [...]

[...] French extreme right could then cash in on this to gain voters among workers . Another reason of the strong ties connecting the workers and the SAP is due to the progressive implementation of the welfare state (at least until the 1990's) that has been supported by the lower classes. On the contrary, the right wing parties were in favour of a reduction and a privatization of the welfare state, and that contributed to gather workers as one behind the left. [...]

[...] In Sweden, extreme right parties lack of such a charismatic leader. Sverigedemokraterna has had three leaders since its creation, and neither the former leader Mikael Jansson or the current one Jimmie Åkesson have the charisma or the experience of Jean Marie Le Pen: Åkesson is only 29 years old! The crisis of Ny Demokrati after 1994 is to some extent a crisis of leadership, and the experience of its co leader Ian Wachtmeister to create a new party (Det Nya Partiet) was a total failure. [...]