If 'Democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people', the citizens' role consists of mostly voting for their representatives during general elections. Still, from time to time, they are also called to vote for referendums. Once seen as an exceptional event, popular votes of this type are now more often used as part of the decision-making process in Europe. Thus, it has been said that direct democracy (that referendum symbolizes) could be a threat for elected parliaments because it inherently contradicts representative democracy. At first, referendum seems to be a rather clear concept but is in fact a dual phenomenon and here a crucial distinction has to be made. Referendum in a large sense designates any direct vote in which an entire electorate is asked to either accept or reject a particular proposal. In its restricted meaning, it concerns only votes launched by political institutions and has to be opposed to initiatives which are triggered by popular petitions.
In this essay I will use the word 'referendum' in its restricted sense. Yet the study will also address the effects of initiatives in parliaments. To do so, I will divide my essay into four sections. First, I will briefly introduce the theories of direct and representative democracy. In the second and third sections, I will examine the effects of referendums in parliaments by analyzing their respective scopes and how they interact. Finally, in my fourth section, I will study the effects of initiatives in parliaments in the context of the Swiss case.
[...] In Hungary the majority supporting a proposal must amount to at least a quarter of the electorate. These requirements led to a situation where “more than half of the referendums within recent years failed to meet these high quorums” (Gallagher, ibid). In Western Europe a few countries have quorum rules. Denmark and Sweden have introduced some but only for constitutional referendum while Switzerland and Italy have more restrictive rules. In Switzerland a referendum is adopted if it reaches a double majority: voters and cantons. [...]
[...] Hence when casting their vote, voters know the type of economic policies a party would pursue if in office. It then makes very little sense to make people come back to polling stations to choose over specific socio-economic alternatives. All in all there seems to be a clear separation of labor between parliaments and referendums. Hence the threat would be limited because the goals pursued are different. In addition I would like to show that the very mechanisms of referendums also limit their potential menacing power. This unfolds in three parts. [...]
[...] First, I will briefly introduce the theories of direct and representative democracy. In the second and third section, I will study the effects of referendums on parliaments by analyzing their respective scopes and how they interact. Finally in my fourth section, I will study the effects of initiatives on parliaments at the light of the Swiss case. The theoretical framework Since the 17th century, democrats have divided in two main schools of thoughts about the institution required to achieve the principles of democracy. [...]
[...] This catch-all category has a pretty low explanatory power and seems to have been designed to solve the case of Switzerland where citizens can vote on basically everything. But it also applies for referendums on nuclear power (Sweden, Austria) or the French referendums on the independence of Algeria in 1961 and 1962. This typology concerns only issues where party lines are not relevant. With the notable exception of Switzerland (and to a lesser extent of Italy), socio-economic matters are still a “chasse gardée” of parliaments. Referendums on such issues are very uncommon. [...]
[...] It follows that referendum would be a real threat for parliaments. However as I will show, this is not the position defended here. Parliaments and referendums: different scopes In a great majority of cases, referendums deal with issues that parliaments do not want or do not feel legitimate enough to tackle. About the 1972 referendum on Norwegian adhesion to the EEC, Lijphart for example wrote that an issue of this nature and importance a parliamentary vote alone would be illegitimate”. [...]
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