What were the problems and successes, if any, of the coalition government in Cambodia? Why did it end in a Hun Sen coup in July 1997?

Résumé du document

The Cambodian Peace Treaty' of October 1991 had been designed to end the two decades of armed conflicts in Cambodia. The objective was to end a civil war, that had been backed mainly by international patrons. The mission hoped to create a 'free and fair' environment, in which elections could be held and democracy established. Initially, reinforced by wide international support and an unprecedented UN operation, the prospects of establishing peace in Cambodia was highly encouraging. Why, when UNTAC accomplished most of its initial mandates, could peace not be maintained in Cambodia? What contributed to the failure of such a peace operation? What brought about the Hun Sen Coup in 1997? To answer these questions, it is first important to define and explain the Paris Peace Accords, and the plan elaborated by the international community before its implementation. The second part will examine and evaluate the concrete UNTAC deployment, highlighting both accomplishments and failures in retrospect to the mission the UN had given itself. Finally, a study of the collapse of the Paris Peace Plan will be examined considering the union of two different complementary explanations. The first explains, that the problems encountered in implementing the plan on the ground created political consequences and therefore, altered the theoretical stability of the government structure. The second attempts, from a more socio-structural approach, to explain the fundamental weaknesses of the plan. According to Pierre P. Lizée, the gaps between Cambodian peace and its violence traditions, made the plan irrelevant and destined to failure since its creation. The following paper will finally propose to discern the lessons to be remembered from the UNTAC experience, and show how they can be useful in further similar operations.

Extraits

[...] Known under the name of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) Interview with Lt-Gen. John Sandereson, UNTAC military commander, Camberra Mar International pressure for stopping support to KR has mainly been excerced by the USA. It also happened as a result of Sino-Soviet rapprochment at the end of the 90's. Lizée Pierre P. Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia. Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution. MacMillan Press Kieuh Samphan succeeded Pol Pot as actual leader of the Khmer Rouge since 1987. MacAlister Brown and Zasloff Joseph J. [...]

[...] - The Police Component was in control of the Cambodian police forces of approximately and ensured that an environment of law and order was maintained within the country. - The Repatriation Component was in charge (conjointly with the UNHCR) of the protection and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. - The Rehabilitation Component was responsible for restoring and ensuring the existence of infrastructure and public services in order to satisfy basic necessities (such as food security, housing, health, education, etc ) With an estimated budget of more than $ 1.6 billion dollars[5], UNTAC was the most expensive mission conducted by the UN at that time. [...]

[...] Hun Sen's coup Four years after the 1993 elections and the coalition government in Cambodia, Hun Sen destroyed the fragile structure put in place by the UNTAC mission. Enjoying a clear military superiority, the CPP's leader conducted a successful coup d'etat against Prince Ranariddh on 5-6 July 1997. Key questions that arise focus on the reasoning behind such a perpetration and what triggered the occurrence of this coup. First, the perspective of new elections in 1998 meant the end of a two- headed state as it would favor of the winner of the elections. [...]

[...] A second notable failure in implementing the Peace Plan was the incapacity of UNTAC to control the state apparatus. As specified in the Paris Peace Settlements, the UN mission would control the five main areas of civil administration[13] on behalf of all the competing parties. By doing so, UNTAC was supposed to prevent any faction (in particular the SOC) of opposing the elections' results using sovereign resources. However, failing to achieve this particular mission gave the CPP the opportunity to ignore the democratic results and force an unfair equal allocation of powers. [...]

[...] Lizée, the gaps between occidental and Cambodian peace and violence traditions made the plan irrelevant and destined to failure since its creation. The following paper will finally propose to discern the lessons to be remembered from the UNTAC experience and show how they can be useful in further similar operations. I. The Paris Peace Agreements A. Historical context The Paris Peace Agreement was signed on October It represented the will of the international community to end two decades of civil war in Cambodia that they were responsible for. [...]