Nuclear proliferation (March 2007)

Résumé du document

With the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, a wind of hope blew across the world. Nuclear proliferation was thought to be a thing of the past, and the building of a peaceful world was believed to be possible. Unfortunately, this season of optimism was short-lived, and soon realised that nuclear proliferation was still a burning current issue. As the report on Proliferation from the Economist highlights, the post Cold War world was different, and the risk that someone might plant a bomb in retaliation is probably much greater today than it was in 1962. During the Cold War, the superpower system created a balance of power, which prevented smaller actors from acting without the superpowers agreement, as was the case when France and Great Britain had to withdraw from their positions in the fight for the Suez Canal, on an American order. A superpower was deterred from acting as he knew his strength evened out with his rival's. It has to be said that nuclear proliferation is less active nowadays than it used to be during the Cold War, except for now, it affects more countries. The number of nuclear weapons has been dramatically reduced. Of the official five, only China is adding to its nuclear force. In the early 90s, the United States and Russia owned about 10,000 warheads each whereas in 2006, these numbers reduced to 5,235 in the US and 3,503 in Russia, and prospective figures for 2012 indicate around 2000 warheads each. Yet, if the number of nuclear weapons has plummeted, the technology has been enhanced. For instance, the US has been developing a nuclear bunker buster and is currently working on a 'reliable replacement warhead', robust and easy to maintain.

Extraits

[...] Also, George W. Bush suggested that all NGS (Nuclear Supplier Group) should refuse trade with countries that have not accepted the IAEA's Additional Protocol and condition cheap fuel on the certainty that the country has renounced enrichment and reprocessing. However, restricting the already cartel led-control supply of nuclear technology and equipment may turn into a huddle and the recent Indo-US nuclear deal undermines the credibility of the American proposal. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA has proposed to create regional consortiums under multinational control where countries could put together their technology and uranium, however negotiations could be difficult and drawn out, and this initiative could end up spreading enrichment and reprocessing skills more widely in regions where countries have nuclear power plans, such as Brazil. [...]

[...] Unfortunately, this climate of optimism was short-lived, and soon we realised nuclear proliferation was still a burning current issue. As the special report on Proliferation from the Economist highlights (February, 28th, 2004), the post Cold War world is different, and the risk that someone might plant a bomb in retaliation is probably much greater today that it was in 1962. During the Cold War, the superpower system created a balance of power, which prevented smaller actors from acting without the superpowers' agreement, as was the case when France and Great Britain had to withdraw from their positions in the fight for the Suez Canal, on an American order; a superpower was deterred from acting as he knew his strength evened out with his rival's. [...]

[...] However, one can only agree that in a world free of nuclear weapons, the cost of cheating would be very high. Moreover, can disarmament ever work in a world where nuclear power is used for civilian use, but still represents weapons-usable technologies? [...]

[...] The role of the US in stemming nuclear proliferation has to be qualified: if the Bush administration did make some useful proposals that materialised into effective improvements of the current system such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the US are not credible in this role of norm setting as they have too often proved that their decisions were grounded on the basis of their own interests. Therefore, what other solutions are there to prevent proliferation? As an international report led Hans Blix highlights, a world with nuclear haves and have-nots is never going to be stable. The best way to get out of these paradoxes is probably to materialise the disarmament promise, and make it more than a slogan. If today nuclear proliferation seems to be the fate of International relations, nuclear weapons are supposed to be on their way out. [...]

[...] Yet, if the number of nuclear weapons has plummeted, the technology has been enhanced. For instance, the US has been developing a nuclear bunker buster and is currently working on a ''reliable replacement warhead''; robust and easy to maintain. Today, more people have nuclear know-how; the world counts various great powers, organised on a regional basis: as the map shows, the Pakistani nuclear installations are close to the Indian border, while the two countries have been in a row since their independence in 1947; similarly in the Middle East, Israel paved the way in nuclear research, followed by Iran, the two acknowledged as not being the best of friends. [...]