The use of mercenaries is not a new phenomenon. Such combatants exist since antiquity, selling their force to princes and states, and so are sometimes called the world's second oldest profession. In the Chapter XII of its famous book “The Prince”, Machiavelli already discuss the advantages and disadvantages of mercenary forces:” Mercenaries […] are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful (…); for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you”. The last decades have seen a rise in the use of such military forces by states. Indeed, states frequently entrust missions to a new kind of mercenaries, the so-called “private military companies” in their usual reserved domains like defense, security, prisons or customs. Of course we will only talk about the privatization of war and war related areas here. The privatization of such areas is raising some issues we will try to deal with in this presentation. For instance, why states have recourse to these corporate warriors? Does only the law of supply and demand regulate these activities like any other economic sector? After a more precise definition of what private military companies are, we will look at the reasons of the recent rise of PMCs and the kind of abuses they may create, and finally we will tackle the problem of the regulation of private military companies by international law.
[...] “Small Wars and Insurgencies: Private Military Companies and Mercenaries for the 21st century” Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, 2002, pp. 54-67. CAPARINI Marina, “Regulating private military and security companies : the US approach”, Private Military and Security Companies -Ethics, politics and civil-military relations pp. 171-188. CAPARINI Marina, “Domestic regulation : Licensing regimes for the export of military goods and services”, From mercenaries to market : the rise and regulation of private military companies pp. 158- 178. DOSWALD-BECK Louise “Private military companies under international humanitarian From mercenaries to market : the rise and regulation of private military companies pp. [...]
[...] Because of their ambiguous status, this personnel is considered as mere civilians accompanying the armed forces. They are therefore facing individual criminal responsibility for the war crimes they may commit (art of the Rome Statute). IHL is more concerned with the responsibility of States which hires them, because these latter have to respect IHL. It was expressed in common art.1 of the Geneva Conventions in which States “ensure respect for the present convention in all circumstances”. They must ensure that PMCs' staff is aware of the rules of IHL, because they are assuming responsibilities toward Prisoners Of War and protected persons (art. [...]
[...] For example, in Switzerland a lot of mercenaries sold their services as combatants for centuries to states of Europe, but in 1848 the Swiss Constitution banned it. In consequence the number of mercenaries fell drastically and they only operate within small groups like in Katanga in 1961 or in Biafra in 1968. However, since the end of the Cold War, there was a reversal of the situation. The 1980s have seen a new demand from states for private military forces. [...]
[...] KINSEY Christopher, “Regulation and control of private military companies : the legislative dimension” in Corporate soldiers and international security : the rise of private military companies pp. 134-151. LEHNARDT Chia “Private military companies and State responsibility”, From mercenaries to market : the rise and regulation of private military companies pp. 139-158. MICHEL Klen , La privatisation de la guerre , Etudes, 2004/9 Tome 401, p. 181-191. HUBAC Olivier (dir.), Mercenaires et polices privées : la privatisation de la violence armée, Paris : Universalis Websites and online resources : GULAM H. [...]
[...] Their judicial system is thereby no properly functioning and has difficulties to be enforced. Moreover, sometimes PMC staff enjoy immunity in the States they are operating, such as in Iraq, where the order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority declared in June 2004 that they should be judged in the country which sent them. It is moreover difficult to enforce the national law of State they belong. In the United States, there is an abundance of law which could be used to judge the actions of PMCs. [...]
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