On the 17th February 1979 the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched a large-scale attack into Vietnam in order « to teach Vietnam a lesson » , according to the words of Deng Xiao Ping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party since Mao Zedong's death. Vietnam answered to the attack to defend its “sacred independence and sovereignty” and until the 16 March 1979 the two countries waged war. The attack led by China was supposed to be decisive and short in order to overwhelm the People's army of Vietnam (PAVN) with massive amount of troops, to capture some provincial capitals and then retreat. Many observers at the time though that this short punitive mission by China was due to the Vietnam invasion of the China's ally, Cambodia, to end the regime of Pol Pot who was exterminating a part of the population to implement his socialist plans .
Clearly, the timing of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict two months after the 25th December 1978 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam suggests that the war was mainly about Cambodia. However, the causes of this war need to be investigated further, because a mono-causal explanation to this real reversal in Sino-Vietnamese relations seems simplistic. Indeed, after the two Vietnam wars, the Sino-Vietnamese's closeness was compared to « lips and teeth » because China had supported the exile of Ho Chi Minh, helped in the revolutionary struggle against France with war material, and sent troops against the USA invaders before 1970.
But in fact, in spite of their rapprochement in the 1950s and 1960s to support the communist cause, Vietnam and China were not natural friends and there are probably other underlying factors, external to the situation in Cambodia, to this sudden punitive mission of China. According to Nguyen Mang Hung, the origins of the conflict are deeply rooted in « history, geography, clash of national interests and policy differences ».
[...] Indeed, according to Xiaoming Zhang, the decision to “teach Vietnam a lesson” was a slow process in which Cambodia was only a precipitant. Already in a meeting in September 1978 Deng Xiao Ping envisaged a war against Vietnam and in November 1978 China made some protests about border violations by Vietnam and warnings about potential consequences and retaliation. But as China feared for its international image, the PRC decided to wait for a good pretext to intervene and to “test the water” in the western countries. [...]
[...] (1981), Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement, P445 CHEN, K.C., (1987), China's war with Vietnam, 1979: issues, decisions, and implications, P27 ZHANG X. (2005), China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment, P854 [16]MANH HUNG N. (1979), The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbours, P1048 SEGAL G. (1985), Defending China, P216 WOMACK B. (2003), Asymetry and systemic misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia [19]MANH HUNG N. [...]
[...] Clearly, China wanted to stop a presumed Vietnamese expansionism. In fact, Vietnam represented a challenge to China's sphere of influence, especially since its accession to full independence in 1975 meaning it was ready for reconstruction and development. As a result, the attack on Vietnam was a way to prevent it to have control over Cambodia but was also a warning to Vietnam expansionism and to other South-eastern Asia countries. China, in a search for respect, also tried to exploit the Cambodia attack to develop an anti-Vietnamese sentiment within the ASEAN League[11]. [...]
[...] Two years earlier, in October 1977 Pol Pot had asked China for military protection in case of Vietnamese attack; when Vietnam invade Cambodia, China pledge its promise of continuing support and aid to Phnom Penh as a justification for the intervention in Vietnam. However, it was more about Cambodia itself than about the “situation”, i.e the genocide, in Cambodia. Vietnam said the intervention was for humanitarian purpose and that US and China were to blame in supporting the Khmer rouge. Obviously, China did not see this attack under the same prism. [...]
[...] China, which wanted to be treated as a Brother” by Cambodia because they had helped the Khmer Rouge, feared that Vietnamese attack endangered its relations with Cambodia. In this context, China certainly attacked Vietnam because it feared that Vietnam would absorb Cambodia[7]. Moreover after the coup in Iran this same year, China and US could not avoid to lose another ally. As a result, we cannot deny that the war was about the situation Cambodia. But wasn't Cambodia more a “good pretext” for China to resolve other disagreements? [...]
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