To what extent do the characteristics of the "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" represent an efficient model of mediation for the Sudanese conflict?

Résumé du document

Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has only enjoyed 15 years of peace and almost 40 of civil wars. Always opposing Khartoum, the South, the Darfur region and even Northern parts managed to oppose an armed resistance to the central power (UNMIS Website). Hence, from 1983 to 2005, Sudan was ravaged by a civil war between Khartoum's central government and the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA), based in the southern part of the country. During this time more than 2 million people died and other millions had to flee fights to neighboring states, giving regional echoes to this Sudanese conflict.

This never-ending conflict appeared has a huge challenge for mediation professionals due to the extreme complexity of its deeply-rooted cultural and political implications and the general lack of political will to prevent it. Nonetheless, in 1993, the Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) presented the latest peace initiative to bring both parties towards a sustainable peace. This was the first step of a decade long process towards the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan (UNMIS Website).

Extraits

[...] To what extent do the characteristics of the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” represent an efficient model of mediation for the Sudanese conflict? Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has only enjoyed 15 years of peace and almost 40 of civil wars. Always opposing Khartoum, the South, the Darfur region and even Northern parts managed to oppose an armed resistance to the central power (UNMIS Website). Hence, from 1983 to 2005, Sudan was ravaged by a civil war between Khartoum's central government and the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA), based in the southern part of the country. [...]

[...] This new government was initially presented as the Government of National Unity (GONU) and included in addition a 52% majority of Omar al-Bachir's NCP and 20% composed of several others Northern and Southern Sudanese parties (Grawert:2010; 3). Hence, all those political changes were supposed to give a much larger room to maneuver within an established institutional framework as well as better political representation to the SPLM and other South Sudanese political movements. The other part of the CPA which is of great interest for our study refers to the disputed areas mentioned above. Settling those disputes was the most difficult points to deal and very few observers remained optimistic on finding solutions to this sticking point. [...]

[...] One of them may without any doubt be its “comprehensive” part which did not take enough account of local and historical credentials proper to the region. Furthermore, the lack of ownership of such agreement by local actors, due maybe to its international dimension and all the countries involved in it, have weakened its implementation on the field and failed to promote reconciliation between local people. Finally, the main points of the Wealth Sharing agreement, key part of the CPA, over oil reserves exploitation and revenues sharing puts light on another central problem of this agreement. [...]

[...] This episode illustrates well the central role played by oil exploitation and revenues between both countries. Yet it outlines as well the existing gap between rulers' concern and the bulk of Sudanese and South Sudanese people, leaving for their vast majority in the countryside, who do not share same priorities at all. As highlighted by Woodward, “water and land were both highly contentious (and related) issues that were not fully or directly addressed” (2010: 236) by the CPA. As a consequence, while authorities struggle for oil revenues, unaddressed water and land issues remain unsolved as ethnic ones. [...]

[...] On the other hand Juba presents an undeniable political will to reach an agreement but its hands are tied by its neighbor's strategy. Indeed, the South Sudanese government suffers from grave financial difficulties due to the lack from oil revenues explained earlier. A financially weakened government will have greater difficulties to implement the CPA and all its components because it will not be able to deal with Khartoum in this process from the same viewpoint (Ben Ami: 2009). Based on this observation, peace perspectives may be lost for good without direct involvement from the international community. [...]