How does Rousseau seek to reconcile freedom and authority in the Social Contract? Is his attempt successful?

Résumé du document

Rousseau has been very influential for many contemporary political thinkers and his work is considered as core in the Enlightenment thinking; his famous work on the Social Contract is widely seen as one of the basis for the establishment of French state after the revolution of 1789. This work, published in 1762, questions the legitimacy of political authority in 18th C Europe by advocating direct or participatory democracy. However, the fundamental issue of the Social Contract refers to Rousseau's attempt to reconcile freedom with authority. Both concepts are central in the organization of Rousseau's political system and his viability depends in the achievement of this marriage.

Therefore, to get a good understanding of Rousseau's Social Contract principles it is essential to get an accurate definition of notions of freedom and authority; so as to explain thereafter how Rousseau seek to reconcile them, especially through ideas of the general will and sovereign. And ultimately assessing to what extent his attempt can be considered as successful according to Rousseau's critics and advocates arguments and to his own paradoxes in his philosophical thinking.

Extraits

[...] Even though Rousseau's conception of freedom is unusual by the fact that it is characterized by the quest of real things by one; pluralism is a key feature of every contemporary democratic society and is indispensable to its functioning. In addition, this criticism is linked to the renunciation of citizens' personal rights by joining the general will; individual rights are core values in modern political systems and their alienation into the general will does not make Rousseau's state a democratic one according to contemporary criteria. [...]

[...] The definition of concepts of authority and freedom according to Rousseau's view is necessary to understand how the author seeks to reconcile both notions in his Social Contract. Indeed, despite the fact that ideas of freedom and authority seem to be opposed in many ways, the aim of Rousseau is to demonstrate how an “association that defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (Rousseau: book1; Ch6) can exist. [...]

[...] Finally, Rousseau underscores that people have a double commitment towards religion and state, since both entities must be divided according to him. Thus the sovereign frame the basic constitutional laws which, thanks to the use of a single one civic religion and censorship, lead people to adhere to the general will. To this point, it seems important to emphasis on the aspect of the sovereign; guided by the general will which comprises all citizens. The sovereign has three clear characteristics knowing that it is inalienable that is, it cannot be symbolized or represented; it is infallible, it can only be just; and ultimately the sovereign is indivisible, namely it must include all citizens. [...]

[...] Linked to the notion of authority, the concept of freedom is core in Rousseau thinking and his understanding is crucial to the comprehension of the Social Contract principles. One of the key characteristic of freedom in his thought is that, in the difference of Hobbes and Locke who consider freedom as a negative concept through which people are left alone outside any society; Rousseau approach freedom in a positive way in the sense that this liberty permits people to acquire or do certain things. [...]

[...] Thus, Rousseau seeks to reconcile freedom and authority in the Social Contract by showing that the sovereign is composed by all citizens that is, they are part of the sovereign; and that it passes laws which reflect their real interests since those citizens are guided by the general will. Since then, the legitimacy of Rousseau's political system lies in the roles played by concepts of general will and sovereign to justify the coexistence of freedom with authority. The success of his attempt may show some limits, principally on the nature itself of the concept of freedom which would undermine the unity of the general will. [...]