Critically evaluate the institutional reforms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty

Résumé du document

Signed in 2007 and entered in force in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon is in fact the combination of two pieces of legislation. The first one is a new version for the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The second one is a replacement of the former Treaty of the European Community (TEC) to the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

It was a new breath s for the institutional structure of the European Union (EU). Indeed, Maastricht and Amsterdam were already out of date. The Treaty of Nice was more an "emergency strap" with little institutional outcomes. Last but not least, it permitted the European Union to reach a "solution" after the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty of 2005 and the rejection of France and the Netherlands.
The birth of this Treaty took several years. After the 2005 French and Dutch referendums, the Council decided to halt the Constitutional Treaty ratification process. A new solution has been found in the summer of 2007 to mainly, converting Constitutional reforms into a "traditional" treaty for the EU. We are still under the "experiment stage" for this Treaty. Put in place after the 2009 European elections, Lisbon entered into force in December 2009.

The euro crisis, adding the "EU bashing" from some member States, the UK potential in or out referendum, the Budget negotiations illustrate how it is complicated to analyse deeply and correctly how Lisbon reforms were put in place and how they changed the game in EU politics. Nonetheless, this gap between "theory and practice" should come to an end and today we can see or at last make hypothesis for the Treaty of Lisbon outcomes. So, can we really state that indeed, the Lisbon Treaty and its outcomes clarified the EU decision-making? Did it cure, at least relatively, cure the lack of democratic accountability, coherence and efficiency in the European Union?

Extraits

[...] Hence, the EP for Paul Craig emerged like the “institutional winner” (Craig page 156). TEU article 14-1 for the Parliament is very important because now, it is a decisive player for budgetary affairs. The EP has to give its consent of the proposed budget before the Council can vote on the budget (TFUE article 312). The trend for the European Parliament is that, and Lisbon helped a lot, this institution looks more and more like almost any other national parliaments. [...]

[...] Critically evaluate the institutional reforms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty Introduction Signed in 2007 and entered in force in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon is in fact the combination of two pieces of legislation. The first one is a new version for the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The second one is a replacement of the former Treaty of the European Community (TEC) to the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It was a new breath s for the institutional structure of the European Union (EU). [...]

[...] We are still under the “experiment stage” for this Treaty. Put in place after the 2009 European elections, Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. The euro crisis, adding the bashing” from some member States, the UK potential in or out referendum, the Budget negotiations illustrate how it is complicated to analyse deeply and correctly how Lisbon reforms were put in place and how they changed the game in EU politics. Nonetheless, this gap between “theory and practice” should come to an end and today we can see or at last make hypothesis for the Treaty of Lisbon outcomes. [...]

[...] Article 17-5 of the TEU stipulates that the next Commission will be compose by one national by member States, and including the President and the High Representative for External Relations will correspond to two thirds of 28 member States (so 17 or 18 members will compose the next Commission, unless the Council votes otherwise). The appointment also worried the Lisbon treaty writers. In order to improve the democratic accountability and legitimacy, the European Parliament and the Council should vote for the new team of the Commission. [...]

[...] But still, those “Conciliation committees” remains blurry in their composition. For instance MEPs are chosen for the trialogue by their parliamentary commission (with the “rapporteur” of the text, the President of the commission and some active MEP about the subjects) but this type of procedure does not exist for the Council. So inside those committees, the legitimacy can be unbalanced between elected MEPs and members of the Council's administration. This would not be possible in the public policy decision-making and can obviously limiting the accountability and the (democratic) legitimacy of the EU decision- making. [...]