Was there ever any realistic chance of an accommodation between the United States and the People's Republic of China in 1949/50?

Résumé du document

In early 1949, China was a nationalist country, ruled by Chiang Kai-shek and sustained by the United States. At the same time, the Chinese Communists were rebelling and ruling large parts of the country, and were constantly progressing. It was obvious that they were soon going to rule the country. As a result, the United States had to rethink its policy toward the Communists and the new regime. The victory of Chinese Communists over the Nationalists and the proclamation of the Republic of China in October 1949 shattered the vision the United States and its Western allies had had for post-war Asia. A Communist China in close proximity to US-occupied Japan, South Korea, newly independent India, the Philippines and war-torn French Indochina made the spread of communism into Asia seems to be another step in the USSR's post-war expansion like in Eastern Europe.

Extraits

[...] policy toward the Nationalists and Taiwan was the main source of conflict between China and the United States. Since World War II, Washington supported the Nationalists, what profoundly irritated the CCP. Indeed, it made the Chinese Civil War last longer, raised its costs and put obstacles to the efforts of consolidation and reconstruction (Hunt p. 188). Moreover, long before Chiang's move to Taiwan, the United States administration considered this island as a very strategic region. As a result they were prepared to use possible political and economic means” to keep Taiwan of the hands of the Chinese Communists” to protect their harbours and military bases there (Grasso p. [...]

[...] As a conclusion, if the greater part of Western studies of this period put the blame on the PRC for the failure of any accommodation because of their radicalism and the way they treated the Americans. In the 1970s a revisionist view, called the “lost chance” school, reversed the blame above all on American policymakers. They argued that Chinese Communists were ready to deal with Washington but their attempts of accommodation were rejected (Goldstein p 120). Nevertheless, the position of the “lost chance” school shows that in 1949, the situation was more flexible than should the context let think (two totally opposed and antagonist camps). [...]

[...] Willingness of finding an accommodation existed in both side offering real chance of accommodation. However, until 1950, if an accommodation could be achieved, she would have only been limited. For instance, it was difficult for the United States to have at the same time an anti-Communist posture in Europe and an accommodating position toward a major Communist country. In 1950, the both countries had finally no choice anymore. The impossibility to resolve the Mukden crisis poisoned Sino-American relations until American diplomats left the country, and the break up of the Korean War and the intervention of the Chinese definitely prevented any further possibility of accommodation. [...]

[...] Thus they would not only depend on the Soviet Union economic and military support. (Hunt p. 209-12) At the same time, in Washington, the National Security Council (NSC) proposed to apply a strategy, which would provoke a schism between China and the USSR, the NSC 41 strategy. The NSC believed that Sino-Soviet relations offered evidences for future tensions between their leaders. For example, Soviet support to the Chinese was quite weak as Stalin attitude in the Chinese Civil War had shown. [...]

[...] Nevertheless public and Congressional opposition to an accommodation with the Communists aborted the most if his attempts of finding an accommodation. (Cohen p32-49) Attempts had been made to end the support of the Nationalist Chinese. For example, in August 1949 the White Paper declared that the Americans would stop additional involvement in China and not support the Nationalist Chinese anymore. This showed the willingness of opening the door to negotiations with the Chinese Communist leaders on the issue of recognition and, maybe, to remedy to the Mukden hostage situation (Grasso p80- 82). [...]