Understanding the Rejection of the European Constitution in France through the Interaction of Politics and Public Opinion

Résumé du document

After years of intense negotiations between member States, the European Convention led by former French President Valéry Giscard d?Estaing submitted the final draft of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter referred to as "TECE") on July 15th, 2003. The aim of the treaty was to streamline E.U. institutions which were rendered obsolete following the admission of 10 new member states in 2004, and in anticipation of future enlargements. The French President Jacques Chirac decided to ratify the treaty with a general referendum, and after a very intense campaign voters decided, on May 29, 2005 to reject the TECE, sparking an unprecedented political and institutional crisis that has yet to be resolved.

Extraits

[...] In any case, the most amazing thing is that the issue of the European Constitution transcended all traditional political cleavages. The drew supporters from across the political spectrum, from the far-left to the extreme-right and within mainstream parties.[7] This can be explained by the fact that many issues were raised during the campaign that one or more parties had a disagreement with. But the most interesting aspect of this extraordinary campaign is that in some instances parties at both ends of the political spectrum called for a vote for opposite reasons. [...]

[...] Many things have been said about the French to the European Constitution and its consequences. However, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the pertinence of the French vote and the effects it has on European construction. Rather, it will be an attempt to explain in greater detail the causes of the French vote by focusing on how the campaign was led by political parties in France and how the TECE was thus perceived by the public opinion. [...]

[...] Their thesis was that voting no was not necessarily an anti-European position, but rather the opportunity to renegotiate the TECE in order to improve it, especially as far as social rights were concerned. They claimed a “stronger” Europe was possible and that saying no would not have a negative effect on the day-to-day functioning of the European Union. Whether it was deceptive or not, this politically clever move probably helped set many pro- European voters' minds at rest: by voting they could voice their disapproval of the situation in France and their rejection of a liberal Europe without jeopardizing the future of the European institutions.[44] Indeed of those who voted thought that it would allow a new constitution to be renegotiated.[45] supporters focused on social issues, in a very favorable domestic context marked by a series of social conflicts that had admittedly very little to do with Europe. [...]

[...] There were indeed very few banal events during the campaign: each TV show, each interview, each documentary, each new publication on the Constitution had a deep impact on the voters, and the most skilled politicians knew how to take advantage of this opportunity. An issue that transcended traditional political cleavages Another extraordinary aspect of the campaign is that it blurred the traditional left-right division that structures French politics. Was it that the campaign was so passionate that personal opinions ended up prevailing over party lines? [...]

[...] No to Raffarin? No to Chirac? No to everlasting high unemployment rates? No to housing problems? No to a tomorrow that looks worse than yesterday? Or no to the Constitution, deemed too incomprehensible? [...]