Tendencies towards privatization of international security management

Résumé du document

In March 2004, after two foreign soldiers were found dead, the world learned that the troops deployed by the United States in Iraq did not consist solely of local soldiers. A shadow army, composed by more than 100000 contractors was there, and among them thousands of heavily armed mercenaries belonging to the most powerful private military firm (PMF): Black Water, founded by Erik Prince. The firm recently changed its name to XE, after some of the personnel were involved in the massacre of 17 civilians, among which were children.

PMFs, profit-oriented firms that provide services linked to warfare, apparently help the states that need military support. But we know very little about them. They are not included in the total death count (we suppose that 780 Black Water men died in Iraq but we are not sure), their injuries are not calculated, and their crimes are not punished. It is almost impossible to know exactly what is happening in the field.

In this paper, I am not going to concentrate on PMFs only but on the Private Military Industry (PMI) in general. Because PMI is not only about sending men in the field. PMI is about training, consulting, and logistics as well. It is an industry that runs a business in and outside the battlefield. It actually generates more then $100 billion each year and is present in more than 50 countries (Image 1).

So the world started by privatizing war with mercenaries, first with mercenary companies in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century and then with classic mercenaries in Congo and Angola during the 1960-70s. We are now witnessing international security privatization, with the PMI. How did this happen? And does privatizing security lead to important consequences?

Extraits

[...] This phenomenon must have consequences on international security management. Let's examine some of these potential consequences A PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM IS A FIRM ABOVE ALL The PMFs, like any other firm, have to find a balance between maximizing their profit and satisfying their client's interest. Except that in the case of PMFs, we are in the military field, which puts the PMF in the middle of a struggle between the economical and the political. Even if the firm claims that it's going to act in its client's best interest, it is not always true. [...]

[...] Moreover, the PMI works like a group of “virtual firms”. Those firms do not have a group of soldiers waiting for a mission, they have access to a kind of “soldier database” and draw from it the personnel they need for each contract. A great asset in matter of efficiency and effectivity. If we talk numbers, you must know that there are a few hundred PMFs with market caps that can reach 20 billion dollars. Some of them merged in order to create transnational companies such as the 1997 merger of the US firm Armor Holdings with the London- based Defence Systems Limited, followed by L-3 purchasing Military Professional Resources Inc. [...]

[...] There are three main reasons behind the emergence of PMFs. First of all, after the Cold War, there has been a great void in the security market. There was trouble in the demand and supply of capable military forces and since there was no longer a superpower pressure, new threats appeared mainly led by nonstate actors, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, etc. In addition, armies shrank by more than 6 million people the fact that left millions of soldiers without a job. [...]

[...] There is an ultimate consequence on international security. Since PMFs are now new military actors, there is a certain impact on public policy, whether we are talking about altering the civil-military balance or escaping from public policy restrictions. While military professionals would like to be more autonomous to do a good job, the institution is organized in a way that civilians control them. But with the emergence of PMFs, and especially military provider and consulting firms, there is a new influence on this balance, if not a real destabilization. [...]

[...] In 1997, Papua New Guinea's prime minister stated: have requested the Australians support us in providing the necessary specialist training and equipment . they have consistently declined and therefore I had no choice but to go to the private sector”. Moreover, usually, when two states form an alliance, they divide their military tasks, which creates a great interdependence. Today, PMFs are able to replace a state that does not want to participate in a conflict for instance. The alliance is weakened, and we could even ask ourselves about its necessity anymore. [...]