Structuralism and history: Levi-Strauss, Althusser, Foucault

Résumé du document

Structuralism may originate from Saussurian linguistics. In the Course of General Linguistics, Saussure defines one essential methodological principle: in response to previous methodologies, which defined historical evolution as the main object of linguistics, Saussure assumes that language must be studied as a system, not a history. To him, one cannot understand the inherent logic of a language by studying its origins, for language is a self-sufficient organized whole. This apparent distinction between history and structure substantially modified linguistics; especially, it introduces a very strong division between synchrony and diachrony. Synchrony, as a time of a relative immobility of language, would permit to explain the system, while diachrony, would describe its modifications. Historical and structural problems, therefore, appeared to be mutually exclusive.
Thus, if we define broadly structuralism as the theoretical perspective that tries to describe its objects as the combination of elements combined in overall structures, structuralism seems to have difficult relations with history. This exclusion appeared to be problematic, from the moment the structuralist approach has been extended to other social sciences. I will try here to explicit these relations. I chose to focus on three main authors related to that issue: Levi-Strauss, Althusser and Foucault. Levi-Strauss, by trying to integrate Saussurian methods to the domain of anthropology, opened a debate that goes largely beyond linguistics. He clearly adopts the label of structuralist, and can be considered a “classical” structuralist. The cases of Althusser and Foucault are more ambiguous, for both of them explicitly rejected this. There are undoubtedly significant differences between those authors; and Foucault and Althusser are not structuralists as Levi-Strauss is; however we can integrate them to the question, for they often have been –willingly or not – described as structuralists, and are clearly linked to the debate of structuralism.

Extraits

[...] But how does Levi-Strauss explain infra-historical modifications of structure? The notion of social change appears here: social change is not history; on the contrary, it appears once history has disappeared. It refers rather to the dynamics observed in universal structures. For Levi-Strauss, there are two reasons for diachrony: changes in structure can be the result of its own contradiction and of external intrusion. The first possibility is quite simple. An external factor can intervene, which will modify the structures of a society, i.e. [...]

[...] For Althusser, structuralism is intrinsically Levi Strauss' universal structuralism. For that reason, he assumes structuralism is only an ideology. But we may think that in reality Althusser's theory is on many points sufficiently closed to structuralism to be assimilated to it. Althusser's structuralism would only be a different type of structuralism which might be called historical structuralism; therefore there would still be a common ground between Levi-Strauss and Althusser. Anyhow, Althusser remains very critical of Levi-Strauss, and we might start from here to understand the original vision of history he develops. [...]

[...] The structure is determined by its effective role. We have then juxtaposed structures that are relatively autonomous from each other. Consequently, we can have histories specific to each category: there is not just one history organized by the notions of continuity and discontinuity, but rather “more complex categories specific to each type of history”. However, history is not a mere juxtaposition of structures that would be completely independent from each other. The relative autonomy of structures is counter balanced by the principle of overdetermination. [...]

[...] The categorization of structuralism into history leads to question the issues discussed by structuralism on history. For Levi-Strauss, there is a clear division between synchrony and diachrony, and the relation between structures and change is resolved in two manners: either internal contradictions or accidental external events. Althusser had criticized this position by saying that it effectively erased history itself, for history was considered as a purely contingent and disturbing movement over structures. He therefore had proposed a new theory of history in a model of relative autonomy of structures organized by a overall overdeterminant, economy. [...]

[...] Finally, Levi Strauss and Althusser answer the same question: How can structures be reconciled with history? For Levi Strauss the solution was to introduce an a-historical form of in structures, for Althusser it is to assert the impact of history on structures. But for Foucault, the very question is not relevant to historical methods: structure/development opposition is relevant neither to the definition of the historical field, nor, in all probability, to the definition of a structural method.” This assumption is probably essential since it completely rejects the synchrony/diachrony dichotomy under its different forms. [...]