The Search for Russian National Identity and Coherent Foreign Policy: Development and Change in Foreign Relations under Yeltsin and Putin

Résumé du document

Traditionally, Russia has been a geographical concept. Its external borders have defined its identity and the strengthes or weaknesses of its leaders and internal organization have determined its external borders. Even its geography is subordinate to the ability of its leaders to secure it effectively. Indicative of this is the strength of the Russian political elite. From the time of the medieval Kievan Rus to the present day Russian Federation, Russia has been led by the powerful. Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine II, Lenin, Stalin, and Breznev all led Russia with the firm hand of nearly unquestioned authority. Great leaders have used their power in the foreign policy realm to expand Russia's territorial borders and security while the weak have allowed this territory to contract and security to diminish. The one element essential and unchanging throughout Russia's foreign policy history has the close linkage between its foreign policy and the authority and personality of its leaders.
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Extraits

[...] Sensing that Russia's destiny was not to be the largest geographical servant of the West, Putin took a decidedly “multipolar” approach to foreign policy. Ignoring Russia's poor geopolitical position relative to the West, and more importantly, the United States, Putin sought out relations with isolated, non-Western states and challenged the United State's hegemonic quest for international obedience. Yet with the terrorist attacks of fall 2001 Putin's reputation as a pragmatic opportunist was justified. Regarding the on terror” as a means to secure Russia's permanent national interests, Putin aligned himself with the United States and Western interests. [...]

[...] Yet following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, these interests, survival, security, and modernization, were all under severe threat. In a geopolitical sense, Russia had taken a large step backward, losing control over large swaths of territory, militarily declining to no more than a regional power (for a few months not even in possession of an independent Russian military), and facing economic collapse. This relative weakness of the Russian Federation, combined with the “loss of national mission, a wounded national pride, and a confused national identity” made it vital that Russia regain a “national purpose” in the practice of foreign policy.[9] Yet, with the decline of the Soviet Union's pervasive ideology, these permanent interests no longer equated to a sense of national purpose or clear identity. [...]

[...] Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002) Sergei B. Stankevich, “Towards a New ‘National Idea,'” in Ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington D.C., CSIS, 1994) Michael McFaul, Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics and the Making of Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22: Ibid [13]Alexei Arbatov, “Russian foreign policy thinking in transition,” Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (Armonk: M.E. [...]

[...] Whether or not this subtle shift was successful in its aims is debatable, but relations with the West were clearly strained. The new U.S. Administration, led by President George W. Bush, saw a revival of the “zero-sum approach to foreign policy” with Russia, as described by CIA director George Tenet.[29] Even the former Westernizing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Kosyrev described Putin's foreign policy as red-star cocktail,” “It's the old stuff of anti- Americanism spiced by the support of rogue regimes.”[30] This description of Russian foreign policy under Putin probably missed its mark ever so slightly, for it would probably be more accurately described as strict pragmatism, but its impact and antagonism was certainly felt by the United States. [...]

[...] Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002) Ibid Ibid Ibid Ibid Henry A. Kissinger, “Russian and American Interests After the Cold in Ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington D.C., CSIS, 1994) William Drozdiak, “Putin Eases Stance on NATO Expansion,” Washington Post, October p. A15. Robert H. [...]