Re-Constructing Afghanistan: After the Bonn agreement

Claire C.

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Re-Constructing Afghanistan: After the Bonn agreement

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Lecture
Résumé
Sommaire
Extraits

Résumé du document

The 5th of December 2001, the Bonn agreement was the first text attempting to build a basis for a new start of the Afghan nation after the American invasion. It was set by international actors as different as the UN, who supervised the conference, the US, the EU, Saudi Arabia and the World Bank. The preamble sets out the overriding goals of the transition process, it should build Afghanistan as a society with a fully representative government "in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice." As ideal guides for the transition process, these goals have no timetable for implementation. The second and main part of the agreement is a precise outline of structures and processes to be realized within two and a half years. This is a strategy of action and is described as a "step towards" the ultimate goals. To understand these goals, it should be taken into account the very specific history of Afghanistan. This country had to undergo more than twenty years of war and conflicts situations. Starting from 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan took control of Afghanistan thanks to a military coup. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as its first President and Prime Minister.

Sommaire

Introduction.
The first fundamental problem: Security in Afghanistan.
1. The underestimation of needs and the dubious security strategies.
2. The warlords: A major threat for security.
3. Regionalism and ethnic conflicts.
4. The difficulties to build a valid Afghan police force.
State building and constitutional basis: Difficult projects and contrasted results.
1. An extremely hard political context to build a democratic state.
2. The need for a strong central state.
3. The Afghan constitution: an important first step.
4. Results and perspectives of the state building.
Building a legitimate state.
1. The difficulties of providing a satisfying ethnic representation without throwing the bases of a new legitimacy for the warlords.
2. The heavy hand of foreign actors.
3. The elections: The end of the transitional process?
Financing the reconstruction.
1. The afghan dependency to foreign donors.
2. Building a formal economy.
3. Understanding the drug economy in Afghanistan.
Conclusion.
Reading list.

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Extraits

[...] Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol Goodhand, Jonathan, “From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol Goodson, Larry, “Afghanistan's long road to reconstruction”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, January 2003. Marsden Peter, “Afghanistan: The reconstruction process”, International Affairs, Vol.79, Issue January 2003. Rubin, Barnett, “Saving Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, January 2007. Suhrke, Astri, Berg Harpviken, Kristian et Strand, Arne, “Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years after Chr. Michelsen Institute Report, 2004. [...]

[...] For instance, the situation of women has not improved at all in this area. Intimidation from local commanders is the most common technique to prevent women from participating to the political life. For example, according to the Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper already quoted, in Kandahar, the husband of a woman that won a spot after the first round selection for the “loya jirga” received a letter from an unknown writer saying: your wife participates in the loya jirga, we will kill you, and if we do, it is your sin, not ours.” Moreover, the students of the female school feel very insecure because of the possible Taliban repression and “gunmen”. [...]

[...] Hoping for a soon coming democratic system seems then hard to realize. The soviet only installed an authoritarian communist state that can not be considered as a model for any further construction. After the Soviet withdrawal, the government steadily lost ground to the guerrilla forces. In early 1992, Kabul was captured, and the guerrilla alliance set up a new government consisting of a 50-member ruling council. Not only this ruling council can not be considered as a model of independency, but also the regional leaders started to monopolize the power. [...]

[...] Some Afghans argued that the common man had little to do with the constitutional process. This process has faced three major problems. First, the choice between an Islamic or a secular modernist state. The draft constitution differed fundamentally from political realities because it praised the absence of religion in political life. The pressure and the intimidation of the religious group were so strong that the commission had to step backward. In the end it emerged as a bland principle specifying that no law should be contrary to Islam. [...]

[...] Enhancing the governance capacity at all administrative levels is the key to transform Afghanistan from an international protectorate into a stable and self sufficient state and it should be prioritized by the international actors in the years ahead. The international actors which had a big part in the beginning of the state building are still indispensable. In an economic dimension Afghanistan is far to be self sufficient to ensure the functioning of its institutions (see part IV). This is preventing Afghanistan from taking independent decisions. For example, the constitution is viewed by many as strongly influenced by the UN and US to support their favorite candidate. [...]

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