The analysis of the institutional system of the European community is characterised by the absence of power separation in the sense of the classical political theory. The coexistence of different institutions doesn't allow the traditional dichotomy between executive and legislative powers. This can be explained by the conciliation between general interest of the community and national interest, between a supranational power (commission and parliament) and an intergovernmental cooperation (Council).
We can wonder about the power repartition, we will focus on the Commission-Council relationship. While the council embodies the intergovernmentality of the system, the Commission is similar to a supranational authority asked to propose solutions on common problems, so it has a power of initiative.
The relations between the Council and the Commission have always been typified by a complex mixture of cooperation and competition. For example there has been a concurrence between J.Solana (the Council's Mr CFSP) and Chris Patten (Commissioner for external relations) in the months after they took up their respective positions in 2000.
These past ten years, the Commission seemed to have lost its influence relatively to the Council in many domains, especially with the CFSP and the JHA, the two new Pillars of the TEU (Maastricht treaty). Does this loss of influence helped or hindered integration? Integration requires EU to have a strong capacity as a negotiator in order to formulate and deliver common EU positions and policies. So which system, supranational or intergovernmental, is the most efficient?
We'll see that if the Commission, making the States act as a single voice, was the motor of the integration, the empowered Council can also be enough strong to go further in European integration.
[...] The Council gains influence during the past decade decreasing powers of the Commission During the past decade the powers and influence of the Commission has been reduced. Its monopoly of the right of initiative knows limits. First with the Maastricht treaty (TEU) in 1992, that states that the Commission has to share of initiative with the Council over the CFSP pillar and has no right over Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. That treaty strengthened the Council with the addition of more intergovernmental elements in the three pillars system. [...]
[...] Bibliographie Ian Bache and Stephen Georges, Politics in the European Union, Oxford University Press; 2Rev Ed edition Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 4th edn Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke Andrew Moravscsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs. and International Cooperation, Cambridge University press Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Wim van Aken and Helen Wallace, When and Why the Council of Ministers of the EU Votes Explicitly, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol No pp. 161-194, March 2006 Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, European Integration Since the 1990s: Member States and the European Commission, Arena Working Papers Beyers, Jan, Where does supranationalism come from? [...]
[...] Increasing influence of the Council If the Commission lost influence relatively to the Council it's because the Council saw its power increase. First, as we've seen with the Maastricht treaty that strengthen its position: the Council of the European Communities became the Council of the European Union in 1993 with powers of decision-making and coordination in the three pillars of the Union: the Community pillar and the two intergovernmental pillars. Its great role played in the 2nd and 3rd pillar is essential because they are arguably the areas of greatest and most innovative activity in the Union today. [...]
[...] “With millions of diverse and highly trained professional employees, massive information-gathering capacity and long-standing experience with international negotiations at their disposal, why should national governments ever require the services of a handful of supranational entrepreneurs?” A. Moravcsik The council can have MORE LEGITIMACY AND EFFICIENCY THAN THE COMMISSION B. Transparency, legitimacy and day-to-day decision making incite the States to integrate more The Council has often been compared with an intergovernmental body, or even a diplomatic conference, at which representatives of the individual Member States defend their national interests and seek to secure a compromise. However, Community provisions and procedures actually govern the organisation and operation of the Council. [...]
[...] Has the Commission's loss of influence relative to the Council during the past decade helped or hindered integration? The analysis of the institutional system of the European community is characterised by the absence of power separation in the sense of the classical political theory. The coexistence of different institutions doesn't allow the traditional dichotomy between executive and legislative powers. This can be explained by the conciliation between general interest of the community and national interest, between a supranational power (commission and parliament) and an intergovernmental cooperation (Council). [...]
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