Parties and party systems in contemporary democracies

Résumé du document

Laver and Schofield wonder what makes length of a government's life through the examples of Italy and Germany, but also of other countries. Firstly, is the number of parties of the political system related to cabinet stability? This is right in Italy, Belgium and Finland. They have a higher effective number of parties than Austria, Germany and Ireland where cabinets are longer. Nonetheless cabinet duration increased in Finland, Luxemburg and Iceland, with the size of the party system from the post-war period to the 1980s, contrary to Germany and Ireland where they went down. Countries with bigger party systems have less stable cabinet even if there is only a little or no relationship. Secondly, the composition of governments affects stability of governments, as show the examples of Italy and French Fourth Republic. Yet, coalition government in Germany, Luxemburg or Austria over the post war period was stable coalition administrations.

Extraits

[...] This question implies change is an evidence. By Mair, voters are related to freezing of party systems in 1920 because statebuilding is determinated by nationbuilding and that is clear that electoral laws are achievements of electoral process. Moreover political parties build their collective organization and their electorate - collectiv identity and values - mobilizing citizens - divisions in society - through suffrage rules. Above all, cleavages such as industrialists versus workers, church versus state in France, center versus periphery, rural versus urban, expressing society changes and thus electorate change, can remain or change the party system. [...]

[...] Whereas proportional system generally produces government containing median party most of the time, in most cases and in most countries! While this is good for congruence, proportional system have a problem with responsiveness : actually how can we know which party in a coalition government or which wings in a government with different trends have responsabilities in government action, because of multistage bargaining ? The Müller-Strom's book proves electoral laws have a big influence on both parties and party systems. [...]

[...] Can we speak of party system change in Ireland despite long-term electoral continuity? The Irish example suggests patterns of change are not a simple categorization of party system changes, but interactions among parties as systemic relevance. If European electorates seem to be frozen in cleavage structures and party alignments from 1920, this is because process of continuous social and political adaptation is the key to survival of parties. Sartori said mobilized electorates, consolidated institutional structures of mass democracy are the first step an established equilibrium. [...]

[...] This is what we discover with the analyzes of the dialectical development of party system by Dalton and of the continuity of electorate by Mair. Differents models such as Elite party in the 19th century, Mass party from 1880 to 1960, Catch-all party since 1945, and Cartel party since 1970 show party system change: the structure of competition had to change. But electoral change is different: people less participate and more protest. The important sequences to mobilize citizens (incorporation, mobilization, activation, and politisation) don't work very well. [...]

[...] Moreover, minority governments show parties, centrist or not, can be in coalition but not in power because of their exclusion of the government, such as the Conservatives in Norway. Despite these different elements, median party may influence a lot the party system when other parties want to form a coalition with them. Thus, parties may concede more than median party in the bargaining system. Then, median parties are more often in power with a proportional system, so they influence electoral law and party system. [...]