To what extent was the Popular Front responsible for France's defeat in 1940?

Résumé du document

The French military collapse in 1940, was one of the greatest military catastrophes in world history . On the 3rd of September 1939, France and Britain declared war on the Nazi Germany, after its invasion of Poland two days earlier. On 10th May 1940, Hitler hurled the German armed forces against France and its ally, Great Britain. They invaded the country in a few weeks, and the 14th of June the German troops entered Paris. Then started the 'exode', six to eight millions people were in flight from France. On 22nd June, the French capitulated, with the armistice going into effect three days later. How can we explain this catastrophic, stunning and total defeat that France suffered? The reasons of this defeat have always been subjects to polemics. Most often, it is assumed that the French politicians and generals failed to prepare for the war. Marshal Philippe Pétain, head of the Vichy regime, attempted to project the responsibility of the defeat on the leaders of the Popular Front government .

Extraits

[...] To what extent was the Popular Front responsible for France's defeat in 1940? The French military collapse in 1940 was one of the great military catastrophes in world history[1]. On the 3rd of September 1939 France and Britain declared war on Nazi Germany, after its invasion of Poland two days earlier. On 10th May 1940, Hitler hurled the German armed forces against France and its ally, Great Britain. They invaded the country in a few weeks, and the 14th of June the German troops entered Paris. [...]

[...] The Popular Front sacrifices numerous electoral pledges to the rearmament policy. In 1938, the military credits use of the national income (Germany: and Great Britain: 0.8 Although there were many constraints: lack of cooperation from the part of the Senate, flight of capital and opposition of the pacifists and the rightists who thought the Popular Front was acting under the influence of the Kremlin. A slogan says communisme c'est la guerre”. Rearm would mean enter in Moscow's game and result in a new slaughtering. [...]

[...] The Minister of the Air, Pierre Cot nationalized about forty companies and proceeded in the modernizations which were imperative. So, in a factory, the duration of manufacturing for a fighter Morane Saulnier MS 406 went from hours in 1936 to 8.500 hours at the end of the year 1938[9]. The only criticism should concern choices operated in the allowance of the credits. Massive investments are made for the Maginot line. Afterward, it is evident that it would have been necessary to strengthen the aviation instead of it. [...]

[...] For him the fundamental causes of the defeat were intellectual: France had become an intellectually ossified and sclerotic society. To resume, as William Shirer, an American historian, says French defeat was a collapse of the army, the government, and the morale of the people”. Nicole Jordan, “Strategy and Scapegoatism” in The French defeat in 1940, reassessments, Oxford Press Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, Histoire de la France au XXe siècle, Editions Complexe Chapter VI Wikipedia, article : Riom trial Robert Frank, le prix du réarmement français (1935 1939), Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne Robert Frank - "Le Front populaire a-t-il perdu la guerre in L'Histoire : "Les années 30 : de la crise à la guerre" - Seuil 1990 Robert Frank - "Le Front populaire a-t-il perdu la guerre in L'Histoire : "Les années 30 : de la crise à la guerre" - Seuil 1990 Figures : Henri Michel, La défaite de la France, PUF Julian Jackson, The fall of France, the nazi invasion of 1940, oxford press Jean-Paul Brunet - "Histoire du Front populaire (1934-1938)" - PUF Collection "Que sais je 1991. [...]

[...] But at this time it was difficult for the Popular Front to predict what could happen. Moreover the Popular Front was an aggregate of left-wing parties, which did not agree on everything. The strong aversion of war hold by France at this period is quoted by many historian as an essential element of the defeat. Actually the fault has to be shared between several factors. The most important reason for the defeat was undoubtedly the strategy of the military leadership inspired by Pétain, Weygand and Gamelin, the obsolete armament and the bad functioning of the army. [...]