Just War Theory: the Case of the war in Chechnya

Résumé du document

With the impeding fall of the USSR, nationalist ideologies began to arise in the Chechen Republic. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Dzhokar Dudayev, president of the Republic of Chechnya declared independence and established the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Unable to effectively govern the country, wide spread corruption and organized crime eventually over took the country. Over the next three years, reportedly 300,000 ethnic Russians fled the chaos while approximately 50, 000 were murdered. On December 10, 1994 under orders from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 40,000 Russian troops entered Chechnya and thus began the First Chechen War. After years of heavy fighting and no clear victor the conflict formally ended on August 31, 1996 with the Khasavyurt accords, stating that Chechnya would be granted autonomous status and would receive full independence by 2001. Although a ceasefire had been signed conditions with the Chechnya remained chaotic and sporadic acts of violence perpetuated by Chechen fighters were frequently used against Russian forces as well as civilians. Such acts were often received harsh reprisal from the Russian military.

In September 1999 the apartment bombing in three Russian cities and encroachment of Chechen forces into Dagestan territory finally triggered Russia's retaliation. Russian forces were order back into Chechnya under the pretension of removing terrorist thus began the second Chechen War.

Extraits

[...] “Beslan school hostage crisis.” 22 November 2005. Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. p. [...]

[...] We should be aware that the situation Russia is facing in Chechnya is not a “traditional” one. Terrorists actually don't behave like a “traditional” enemy and besides, it is unclear that they even themselves deemed to be morally subject to proportionality constraints. A “terrorist” is even rarely considered under the legal definition of a combatant. Meanwhile the popular legitimacy of the war is still largely regarded as partly dependent on the concern with proportionality. Let us now review each of the three conditions that prevail as reasonable chance of success and proportionality are concerned: a value judgement about the worth of the cause that purports to justify the recourse to war: According to Richard Sakwa, successful secession of one area could have acted as the catalyst for the disintegration of the state leading to Yugoslav-style wars and ethnic cleansing.”[16] So the risk was a destabilization of the Russian state, especially at a time when “Russia itself was trying to democratize on a civil and federal basis.”[17] Moreover, we should take into account the ethnic minorities, especially the Russian ethnic minority in Chechnya, who does not necessarily want to break with Russia. [...]

[...] According to the terms of the “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security”, signed at the OSCE summit in Budapest in 1994, and especially to its paragraph “participating states will take appropriate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms”, and according to its paragraph 25, participating States will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities”. More precisely, Russia is likely to enforce international law by securing the Northern-Caucasus region which is a territory under its sovereignty. Russia is fighting for its stability and the security of its citizens. [...]

[...] Thus the main feature of this war is anti- terrorism. It implies a certain way of fighting a non-identified enemy in respecting the jus in bello and not presuming that all Chechens are terrorists. II. Jus In Bello: The Justice of the Means The second category of conditions which must be considered in terms of the justice or injustice of a war is that of jus in bello. Under jus in bello we examine the means by which an actor fights the war. [...]

[...] For the purpose of analyzing the actions of militant Chechens from 1999 to the present day, we will consider them as they apply to the traditional standards of international law in war times. Having said this, it is still quite easy to justify calling many of the acts of Chechens in the past decade as acts of terrorism. In judging whether or not the Chechens have fought the war justly, we have to consider the ends they hoped to achieve. It is impossible to consider the resurgence of conflict under Maskhadov in 1999 as separate from the previous war for independence. [...]