Japan's security relations with South Korea

Résumé du document

In spite of the cultural closeness between Japan and South Korea, the relations between the two countries have been no exception to the general rule that the immediate neighbours often find it hard to live in harmony. Their relationship actually suffered from a long-standing enemity, the origins of which can be traced back to the early phases of Japan's and South Korea's histories. Progressively, the Japanese came to develop a mixture of condescension and contempt for the Korean people, which led to the classification of Korea as an inferior state, and that which had to be conquered. The end of the Second World War marked the end of the 35 year colonial occupation of Korea by Japan. In the aftermath of World War II, both Japan and South Korea had to face constraints that limited their role in defence and military activities. Legacies of the colonial occupation and long-lasting territorial disputes have remained as major obstacles to the development of a strong relation.

Extraits

[...] More generally, different interpretations of history, South Korea's demand for moral and material compensation, Tokyo's refusal to pay reparations and to apology for colonial exploitations and atrocities, and ‘Japanese attempts to gloss over or ignore the dark side of the colonial era in school textbooks'[10], became major obstacles to the establishment of formal relations between the two countries after WWII The territorial dispute over the Takeshima islands Tensions between Japan and South Korea were also exacerbated by the territorial dispute over the ownership of two tiny rock islets in the Sea of Japan with a total area of 0.23 square kilometre[11], known as Takeshima by the Japanese and Tokdo by the South Koreans, which had belonged to an ancient Korean kingdom before becoming part of Japan's imperial territory until the end of WWII[12]. The status of the two uninhabited islands, which represented national pride for both Japan and South Korea, and the access to their rich fishing grounds became a highly politicized issue, involving different interpretations of historical encounters and of international law. In the aftermath of WWII, South Korea claimed sovereignty over the islands on the grounds that the SCAP had excluded them from Japanese jurisdiction in 1946 by placing them outside the operational zone for Japanese fishermen. [...]

[...] Thus, the future of Japan's security relations with South Korea seems extremely uncertain. The low-level security cooperation may even deteriorate hugely should the perception gap between Japan and South Korea over issues concerning both past history and present developments prevail over mutual political, economic and security interests. Bibliography Bridges, Brian, Japan and Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment (Cambridge, University Press of Cambridge, 1993). Fern, Sean, ‘Tokdo or Takeshima?: The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute', Stanford Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol No Winter 2005, pp. [...]

[...] as the major mechanism influencing Japan- South Korea security relations, as illustrated by the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996. II. The Japan-South Korea bilateral security relation: towards a low- level security cooperation in the post-Cold War era 2 The emergence of bilateral security relations during the Cold War During the Cold War, direct bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea remained rare, but began to emerge as personal connections between Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and the South Korean President Doo-Hwan Chun developed during the 1980's. [...]

[...] military presence in and around the Korean Peninsula'[21], which led to the development of an indirect security relationship between Japan and South Korea that remained largely function of Japan-US relations'[22]. The influence of the Japan-U.S. alliance mechanism can be seen for example through what has been called the ‘Korea Clause', first introduced in the Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of 1969, then reasserted in the Chun-Nakasone communiqué of 1983, in which Japan recognized that the security of South Korea was essential to its own security[23], which has often been seen as one-way street of security interest, paved mostly with Japanese financial loans and American prodding'[24]. [...]

[...] Manosevitz, ‘Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence', p Glenn Hook (et al.), Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p Glenn Hook (et al.), Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment, p Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment, p Figures mentioned by Brian Bridges in Japan and Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment, pp. 12-4 Glenn Hook (et al.), Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p Jason U. Manosevitz, ‘Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence', p Jason U. Manosevitz, ‘Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence', p. 810-1. Jason U. Manosevitz, ‘Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence', p. [...]