Tallberg, J. (2003) ‘The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency’

Résumé du document

The Presidency of the European Union Council is an attribution that is not often analysed in the literature on EU decision-making. To put it briefly, the member state holding the Presidency of the Council for six months is in fact chairing the meetings of the European Council, meeting at least twice a year, and of the EU Council. As it is defined by the Treaties as an organisational function, only a few academics devoted attention on it as an influential agenda-shaper. However this occupation, following the example of many European institutions, developed itself apart from its legal attributions throughout the years. As a result, it needed to be reconsidered and this has been done by Tallberg in his article The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency. It is a rather straightforward piece of work so we will go through Tallberg's main arguments following his own order. We will see that even though Tallberg's findings are hardly questionable - as he is using both theoretical and empirical methods - there is still a need to develop some of them.

Extraits

[...] This explains why member states succeeded in developing means - identified by the author - in order to make a strategic use of the Presidency. As we have seen above, the Presidency is a rather undefined institution and as a consequence member states can remain in control of a transnational situation, mainly by avoiding issues (agenda-exclusion) or on the contrary by emphasizing some of them (agenda-structuring). III. Why would member states accept such a steering power? Tallberg's last inquiry was to know why such a fraudulent system is allowed by the other states. [...]

[...] With such a theoretical framework, the possibilities for influencing the agenda are greater than it seems and this leads to a rather less negative opinion on the EU Council Presidency influential power. As underlined by Kirchner, “Presidencies cannot switch programmes, but they can select certain priorities” (Kirchner, 1992: 104). All three dimensions of the agenda-shaping are supported by interviews with diplomats or Commission officials and by examples making clear that member states do know they can answer national problems through the strategic use of these presidential functions. [...]

[...] There is no mention of substantial powers held by the Presidency's state, which made some scholars such as Jean-Louis Dewost say that it is a “responsabilité sans pouvoir” (Tallberg, 2003: 3). It does not confer any extra voting power during the meetings; it is primarily about organising and chairing them, it is a manager function. More precisely, Tallberg mentions three recurrent arguments willing to prove the uninfluential power of the EU Council Presidency: 1. As said above, no important official power has been delegated to this function, especially not the power of initiative; 2. [...]

[...] Also a state is more likely to get its proposal adopted on issues requiring qualified majority voting than unanimity (1139). All of these constraints added to Pollack's, show that the agenda-shaping power of the EU Council Presidency is in a great extent conditional and this has not been enough specified in Tallberg's article. We have seen that a closer look to the Presidency role is needed to realize that it is not just an organisational tool and that its influence has been underestimated in the literature. [...]

[...] However, as correctly argued by Tallberg, this “informal” agenda-shaping power[3] is only sustainable when certain conditions are met. According to him, this situation is only possible when the consequences of issues prioritization on other member states are insignificant or uncertain. This last part of Tallberg's article is perhaps leaving the reader unsatisfied since this very idea of invisible red line that you cannot cross” could be more developed. Other conditions indeed exist for a state to be able to influence the agenda-shaping, as denoted by Pollack. [...]