International Political Theory: The rules of international organisations and the activism of international bureaucrats significantly affect bargaining between states

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An international organization is an organisation that is supposed to promote cooperation and policy coordination. The term is usually reserved for intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization, with sovereign states as members. They seek to solve problems not limited to national boundaries such as the search for justice, the promotion economic welfare and social progress, or the management of global resources, in the public interest. International organizations have been viewed, at one extreme, as the vanguard of an emerging world government, and at the other, as an exercise of ineffectiveness in promoting cooperation between sovereign states. The term "bureaucrats" refer to the officials of high administrations. The term "bargaining" can be defined as every interaction, any negotiation. States are the principal actors in the international relations. They are usually expected to behave egoistically and rationally. Thus, nowadays, we tend to think that international rules are effectively not respected and that states think that the institutions which could enforce it are not efficient and threatening enough. And if according to some international lawyers, "international bureaucrats, unelected and without coercive power can really influence the decision of powerful nation-states" (Moravscik, 1999), we can doubt about general claims about the influence of international organizations.

Extraits

[...] Thus, they exercise leadership rather than formal power words Bibliography Perry Anderson, "Our Man" (Review of books on Kofi Annan) John Bolton and others, Global Structure Convocation 1994, "Human Rights, Global Governance, and Strengthening the United Nations". James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War", International Organization James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation", International Organization Robert Keohane, After Hegemony Andrew Moravcsik, New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation", International Organization William Phelan, Note on the Recognition of the Supremacy and Direct Effect of European Law by the EU member states. T. R Reid, The United States of Europe, Welch's Waterloo pp. [...]

[...] 88-110. P. Sands, Lawless World, "Kicking ass in Iraq", pp. 174- Richard H. Steinberg, "In the Shadow of Law or Power" International Organization 2002. [...]

[...] But it can be argued that, because these organizations bring together states which have a common interest, states tend to obey international organizations rules. International organization can affect bargaining between states in several manners. They change the length of negotiations and the number of states becoming members to the agreement. Indeed, they can increase cooperation by encouraging states to ratify international agreements and increasing the level of depth attained by the agreement. International organizations can be first proposers of bargaining. This is frequent. Thus, some agreements would maybe not exist without international organizations' propositions. [...]

[...] He goes further arguing that: If the highly developed supranational entrepreneurs in the EC only rarely wield influence, we have reason to be sceptical of general claims about influence in international organizations weaker, less prestigious secretariats, such as the WTO and the IMF, multilateral development banks, UN agencies, and environmental organizations. Such institutions do not directly of formally constrain negotiations. Saying that international organizations or bureaucrats significantly affect bargaining between states would mean that a third party influence on international negotiations. It would be contrary to the realist theory (Moravcsik, 1999). But international organizations are created by states. [...]

[...] We can also argue that the democratic system of some international organizations, such as the European Union or the United Nations, allow small countries to have their say. The rules being formulated by unanimous or near unanimous consensus of members, some argue that an organization cannot continue to be the instrument of policy of a few dominant members when the membership is as varied as that of the UN. But it is true that Steinberg (2002), Bolton (1994) and Perry Anderson (2007) say that the rules do not affect bargaining between states because the powerful states dominate these IO. [...]