La légitimité du lobbying dans l'UE

Résumé du document

This multiple and varied representation of interest might be regarded at first sight as a positive expression of the European citizens' concern for the EU ? a way to bridge the gap between inhabitants and institutions. Moreover, as emphasized in Article 12 of the ECFR , it would be in accordance with the democratic principles of assembly and association. But ?to most, lobbyists lurk in the shadows, carry briefcases, and engage in generally unethical activities in an underhanded way' . Thus lobbying seems also to be a danger for the EU democratic system ...

Extraits

[...] This multiple and varied representation of interest might be regarded at first sight as a positive expression of the European citizens' concern for the EU a way to bridge the gap between inhabitants and institutions. Moreover, as emphasized in Article 12 of the ECFR[3], it would be in accordance with the democratic principles of assembly and association. But most, lobbyists lurk in the shadows, carry briefcases, and engage in generally unethical activities in an underhanded way'[4]. Thus lobbying seems also to be a danger for the EU democratic system. [...]

[...] Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe see http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/apgen_en.htm (visited the 20th of february) http://www.eu.milieukontakt.nl/index.php?page_id=22&style_id= (page visited the 9th of February) Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, first edition 1999, second edition 2005), p.213 Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, p.19 Rory Watson and Michael Shackleton, Organised Interests and lobbying in the EU, in Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb, The European Union: How Does it Work, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003), p.89. Stephen George and Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001) p Helen. Wallace and Alasdair R. [...]

[...] Indeed, lobbyists and the EU. institutions have a ‘symbiotic relationship'[18]. Mazey and Richardson grasped the very nature of this relation by noticing that, although ‘groups are, of course, drawn to Brussels by a desire to defend and promote the interests of their members in the context of EU policy making'[19], the European institutions are ‘equally dependent upon groups'[20]. Our task is now to understand further this reciprocated dependence. There are three main targets for lobbyists[21]: the commission, the European parliament and the Council of Ministers often via the COREPER[22]. [...]

[...] Interest groups thus appear as essential actors for the commission, by bringing more democracy into the legislative process. Alternatively, the Council of Ministers is harder to lobby. Indeed, it is composed of different ministers of the 25 member states, and therefore has access to their resources. Of course, interest groups try to influence the council via COREPER, but the impact is fairly small. Another crucial institution for lobbyists is the EP. Among its competences, it votes the laws proposed by the commission, and can modify or block legislation. However the EP cannot propose legislation. [...]

[...] At this point, statistics make obvious that at both sectoral and regional level there is a profound unbalance concerning interest representation. As computed by Greenwood[12], business interest is with 66% of the interest representation far more represented in Brussels than for instance public interest with 20% or trade unions. Out of 3000 groups represented in Brussels, there are over 1,500[13] business congregations. This raises the following issue: how can the interest representation system be democratic if only a fraction of the population is adequately represented? [...]