Discuss de Gaulle's handling of the Algerian War and consider some of the ways in which he exploited the crisis to political ends

Résumé du document

In 1954, the discontent displayed by Algerian rebels, the Front de Libération National, demanding independence, turned into war and was not settled until 1962, with the involvement of the French national hero, General de Gaulle. The situation in Algeria was different to that in Tunisia or even Morocco due to the fact that Algeria was an integral department of France and not a colony. “The rebellion of 1954 became a war because a numerically dominant but economically and politically backward Moslem population, in a large, strategically situated territory, geographically very close to France, sought independence from her, while a minority mainly of European origin, politically, economically and administratively dominant, wanted passionately to remain French”1. Due to France suffering defeat in Europe in 1940, and in Indochina 14 years later, accompanied by the loss of Tunisia and Morocco, it was particularly important for their national esteem that they be on the victorious side in the Algerian crisis. Therefore “in 1958 the Fourth Republic handed over to General de Gaulle the whole insoluble problem of Algeria”2 as General de Gaulle was deemed the only man possible to solve the situation and avert a civil war.

Extraits

[...] General de Gaulle did not commit to his policy on Algeria until September 1959, when he felt strong enough. statement was carefully phrased so that, logically, neither supporters of Algérie française nor those who wanted a negotiated peace could take exception to it.”8. He had proposed three possible outcomes, these being secession, integration (although de Gaulle often referred to this as francisation) and association. secession, de Gaulle meant the severance of all bonds between Algeria and France, whether economic or military. [...]

[...] had been accepted as Prime Minister, and later as President, because the nation was counting on him to solve the Algerian problem and action was, therefore, expected of him. But, unless the rebel forces surrendered, which was the only condition on which the army leaders would agree to a cease-fire and to possible negotiations on Algeria's future, he was condemned for the time being to continue the policy of M. Mollet and his successors in office.”12. General de Gaulle was in a very complicated situation; he needed to gain support from all sides in efforts to restrain the army. [...]

[...] But then came the shock: “Given all the facts in Algeria, national and international, I consider it necessary that the recourse to self-determination be proclaimed beginning today. In the name of France and the Republic, by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution to consult the citizenry, on the condition that God may grant me life and that the people may listen to me, I commit myself to asking, on the one hand, the Algerians in their twelve departments what they definitively want to be, and, on the other, all the French people to endorse that choice.”9. [...]

[...] The Moslems listening to this speech were therefore under the impression that they were going to become full French citizens and the Europeans or pieds noirs understood that Algeria was going to remain French. General de Gaulle was by no means a stupid man; so, it has been suggested that privately, he knew that for Algeria to remain French, the Moslems would need full French citizenship. This would be quite impossible, as Moslem and French integration would not work because “these two communities differed in their religion, civilisation, racial origin, and political outlook”4. However, fact that independence was inevitable does not mean that it is, in practice, possible.”5. [...]

[...] De Gaulle exploited his victory in solving the Algerian crisis to benefit him and really mould the Fifth Republic to suit him. In conclusion, “General de Gaulle employed both direct and indirect tactics to restore the authority of the state and to increase his own authority and prestige as head of the state. The Constitution was designed to be an instrument of presidential power, as well as of government stability, and the President's conception of his own function as “arbitrator” did not prevent him from combining in practice the roles of umpire and captain of the team. [...]