The Democratic Deficit in the EU

Résumé du document

For years, the European construction appeared to be legitimate through a 'permissive consensus' since no significant opposition to the integration process was to be noticed. Nevertheless, a major debate underlined a 'democratic deficit' in the 1980s, denouncing that the European Community had been built without the people. Indeed, at the beginning of the integration process, neo-functionalists, such as Monnet, who were actively engaged in the building of the EU, did not see the necessity to include the people in this project. For instance, Mitrany, who theorized functionalism, had a technocratic planning vision of the European Community implying a government by experts, which was consequently undemocratic (Sewell, 1966, p.42). Nevertheless, essentially since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the debate it created, European issues became politicised. From this point, the public increased its interest towards the EU and was willing to participate in the integration process.

Extraits

[...] Via democratic ‘praxis' the demos is constructed. Thus, a real European electoral contest could be the ‘democratic baptism of a European democratic community' (1995, p. 90-3). In brief, this alternative perspective believe in the possibility of designing institutions to create partisan and competitive democracy at the European level, against the new governance analysis that traditional forms of participation are impracticable beyond the nation state (Hix p353-5). This view also contrast with the simple view that only an increase of the EP powers would be sufficient to guarantee more democracy in the EU. [...]

[...] He distinguishes two conceptions of democratic legitimacy. First, an ‘input legitimacy' or ‘government by the people' which requires that collective decisions ‘reflects the general will' of a people as in parliamentary democracy. Yet, in the EU this is difficult to achieve due to the lack of a European demos. The second conception, the ‘output legitimacy' or ‘government for the people' put constraints on policy outcomes rather than policy inputs. This simply requires the satisfaction of the public of ‘problem solving'. [...]

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[...] As a result, the EP does not benefit from a democratic mandate for a legislative majority to redistribute resources through EU legislation and capture the regulatory agencies and the Commission. Increasing the power of the EP as prescribed by the standard interpretation of the democratic deficit may reduce rather than increase EU legitimacy (Scharpf p.138). Nevertheless, as several theorists explain (i.e. Schmitter, Weiler) there are other ways to introduce competition and choice into the EU process. The necessity is to change present rules to make the electoral contest fought on European issues (i.e. [...]