The failure of the Arusha Process in the Rwandese Crisis

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The failure of the Arusha Process in the Rwandese Crisis

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Lecture
Résumé
Sommaire
Extraits

Résumé du document

The 1994 Rwandese genocide happened in the following of a civil war which had begun more than three years earlier. In October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which gathered the Rwandese who were refugees in south Uganda (mostly since the decolonization period at the end of the 1960s), launched an attack against the north of Rwanda in order to obtain the right to return to this country and the share of the political power. From then on, regional actors involved in discussion between the RPF and the government of Rwanda (GoR), and in monitoring the successive cease-fires. But as no sustainable solutions were found in this way, the international community intervened and, in June 1992, the United States and France brought the two parties in a long negotiation process: The Arusha process. After more than one year of discussion, these peace negotiations ended with the signature of agreements by both parties on the 4th August 1993. These one are considered as "a virtual textbook case of modern conflict management". However, its aim of a long-term resolution of the conflict was obviously not reached, since the genocide took place eight months after its signature.

Sommaire

Introduction.
The negotiation phase: A commended process, but an imbalanced final text.
1. The design of the negotiation process in itself was very good.
2. The participants.
3. The choice of an inclusive peace process.
4. A comprehensive strategy.
5. The final text.
6. The transitional institutions.
7. The new national army.
8. Explanation of the imbalanced accords.
The failure of the implementation of the accords: A multi-level responsibility.
1. The unamir, key issue of the implementation of the accords.
2. A minimalist design.
3. The unamir was not continuously adapted to the evolution of the situation.
The strengthening of the hutu extremists directly caused the failure of the arusha process.
1. By developing their influence, the hutu extremists directly impeded the implementation of the arusha accords.
2. The settlement of a climate of violence.
3. The diplomatic failure.
4. The weakness of the unamir greatly facilitated the extremists' work.
Conclusion.

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Extraits

[...] Every aim was reached. All of these facts created perfect conditions for the launch of the genocide on the 6th April 1994, following the mysterious lethal crash of the President's plane. Conclusion The genocide constitutes the end of the Arusha process, and the symbol of its failure. When the massacre was launched, Tanzania organized a meeting in Arusha between the GoR and the RPF, but the talks were abandoned after two days. That was the final dot to the Arusha process. [...]

[...] It was composed of 21 persons, in which 5 RPF and 5 MNRD. The moderate party MDR obtained 4 seats, in which the one of Prime Minister and of Foreign Minister, as it was the case in the former coalition government. Although MNRD President Habyarimana kept his position, the ex-ruling party was left with only 5 portfolios out of 19, most of them being politically insignificant. Then, in the idea and in the reality, the BBTG was an attack against the northern-west Hutu based regime that Habyarimana erected for nearly 20 years. [...]

[...] This was the consequence of the will of the UN to save money, and of its fear of transforming a consensual peacekeeping operation into confrontational peace enforcement. Moreover, in October 1993, the new elected President of Burundi Melchior Ndadaye and six of his ministers were killed by soldiers of the Burundian army. This event created a flow of refugees from Burundi to south Rwanda, which the international force had to look after. This required the utilisation of UNAMIR soldiers, who were already few, for a mission which did not belong to their mandate. [...]

[...] It works as a place where the GoR and the RPF could talk of tricky issues in an informal atmosphere. Then, official negotiations were not threatened every time a problem occurred on the field. I A comprehensive strategy Mpungwe decided to lead a comprehensive strategy in order to resolve the conflict. That means that he wanted to deal with all the roots of the civil war, but as well with the consequences of the conflict itself. Eventually the Arusha Accords, signed on the 4th August 1993, gave detailed solutions to every problem. No issues were left aside. [...]

[...] The right for the refugees to return was decided. Moreover, the problem of the inequality of citizenship between Tutsi and Hutu was dealt with. The accords declared all the Rwandese citizens equal, and the ethnic identity cards were abolished. Concerning the political claims of the RPF, the institutions of Rwanda were modified. The regime, which was presidential so far, became parliamentary. The President lost nearly all his power, which was transferred to a Council of Ministers. Transitional institutions had to be set up within a short period (22 months) which was supposed to end with elections. [...]

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