Explaining constitutional choices in post-communist transition countries: the actor-centered approach.

Résumé du document

Among the most important of all constitutional choices that have to be made in democracies is the choice of relationship between the executive and the legislature, in particular presidential versus parliamentary government. Political scientists disagree about which of the alternatives are preferable, but they are in agreement that the choices made by democratic constitutional engineers can have far-reaching effects on how well the democratic system operates. For democratizing countries, these choices are particulraly crucial because the success of the newly founded democratic system depends on it. In addition, if the new democracy does prove to be viable, the initial choices are likely to last for a long time. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan have pointed out that the party system established at the beginning of a country's democratic experience tends to become virtually frozen. This applies even more strongly to the fundamental constitutional structure: drastic constitutional changes like shifts from presidentialism to parliamentarism or vice versa are extremely rare in established democracies. This paper will explain the preference of one political regime upon another.

Extraits

[...] Russia's postcommunist institutional choice was designed deliberately to insulate the president from the parliament. The president works through the council of ministers, a special security council, and the presidential administration to make policy. Power is concentrated in these elite bodies. Old regime elites from the military, internal security, bureaucracy, industry, regions, and even the orthodox church have looked to the president to protect their access to power resources from the encroachments of democratization, liberalization, and marketization Conclusion Across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, postcommunist regime change has produced a variety of unconsolidated democracies and reconfigured authoritarianisms. [...]

[...] Steffani, Winfried (1979). Parlamentarische und präsidentielle Demokratie. Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien. Opladen. Stepan, Alfred & Skach Cindy (1994). Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in comparative perspective. In: Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela (Eds.): The failure of Presidential Democracy. Baltimore-London, The Johns Hopkins University Press: 119-136. Stranger, Allison (2004). How important are new constitutions for democratic consolidation? Lessons from the post-communist states. Democratization 1-26. [1]Krouwel, A. (2003). [...]

[...] In contrast to the rest of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic states opted for parliamentarism in their post-communist transitions. In the second half of the 1980s, Estonia developed a national revival movement that promptly evolved into a mass-based national separatist movement. In the late 1980s, the Estonia's nationalist movement proved his political strength by displaying a series of collective actions, such as popular demonstrations and economic boycotts. The most significant demonstration of strenght being the movement's victory in the in the 1990 republican legislative elections. [...]

[...] A coalition of democrats and former communists, known as Democratic Russia, soon emerged as a parliamentary bloc. Russia's communist elites did not succumb to a process of self-destruction, such as occurred in Estonia. Instead, they were forced to reform themselves in order to adapt to the new processes and structures of power. Those old regime elites that were able to make this transformation emerged from the breakdown phase sharing power uneasily with a disparate collection of new political actors. From its inception, the Russian presidency was the object of power struggles. [...]

[...] Page 187. Op.cit. Easter, Gerald. Page 188. Op.cit. Easter, Gerald. Page 188. Op.cit. Easter, Gerald. Page 188. Op.cit. Easter, Gerald. Page 188. The table displays how, in accordance with Gerald Eastern's analysis, structural variations of old regime elites influenced institutional choice in the transition phase. Easter, Gerald (1997). [...]