Ability to change in the social area, veto points and strategies used: the example of French pensions' reforms in 1993 and in 1995 in Bonoli's book The Politics of Pension Reform: Institutions and Policy Change in Western Europe (2000)

Résumé du document

Several authors underline the fact that Europe's 'conservative-corporatist' regime of countries faces the most difficult combination of problems due to strong challenges to its foundational assumptions (particularly strong and constant economic growth, full employment, family stability, a low level of female work force participation) and an institutional structure that is resistant to reform . Empirical evidence thus suggests that Bismarckian pension systems are less resistant to reform than is frequently assumed. France belongs to this category and does not escape from these issues. That is why, the country has been facing these problems, since the 1970s, and a series of pressures have shaken the social protection structures that were created and developed in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. This theme became central to the European social policy agenda.

Extraits

[...] Pp. 110-150; Myles J and Pierson P Political Economy of Pension Reform”, paper presented at the workshop New Politics of the Welfare State”, Center for European Studies. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA? 30 October 1 November Pierson, P Dismantling the Welfare State? : Reagan, Thatcher and the politics of retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p Bonoli, Giuliano. Op. cit. p Bonoli Giuliano. Op. cit. [...]

[...] p Pierson, P Op. cit. Bonoli, Giuliano. Op. cit. p Pierson, P New Politics of the Welfare State”. World Politics 143-179 Schmitter, P “Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo- corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-corporatism May Be Going”, in Mehmbruch and Schmitter 1982. Myles and Pierson 2001. Natali 2004. Beland 2001. Boeri et al Natali 2004 Natali David and Rhodes Martin.Op. cit. [...]

[...] cit. p Bonoli, Giuliano. Op. cit. p. 143-144 Natali and Rhodes. P Christian de Brie, Résister à l'insécurité sociale Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 1996. [...]

[...] In this case, referendum can be a political way to prevent trade union's blockage, and is not obligatory contrary to Switzerland or called by external groups. The fifth possible veto concerns the executive, if this one is dual or not, i.e. if the president and the parliament belong to two different political camps. When presidency and parliament are in the hands of the same party, then power concentration is strong. When, in contrast, the two are controlled by different camps, there is an element of power fragmentation in the political system. [...]

[...] A negotiated approach is more likely to emerge in corporatist countries, partly because corporatism is associated with strong and well labor movements[34] and partly because the existence of a corporatist tradition of concertation in policy-making provides a political climate which can be more conducive to successful negotiation. Trade unions play a critical role in introducing new pension provisions[35] because they act and are perceived as the main defenders of welfare programmes. They participate in a more or less institutionalized manner in both policy- making and policy implementation and have multiple interests to defend[36]. [...]