The Cuban Missile Crisis - In the media, in the White House and in the American public opinion

Thèmes abordés

Cuban Missile Crisis - CIA - Kennedy - Castro - Khrushchev - White House - Washington Post - New York Times - Moscow - Cuba -

Résumé du document

Regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, compare the story (i.e., one or more interesting aspects of it) as told by the declassified documents of the CIA with the version presented to the public in: a) The New York Times or The Washington Post; b) presidential of official foreign policy statements. The paper should discuss what the comparison suggests or implies about how US foreign policy is made at top levels and how it is presented to the general public. What reasons might explain any discrepancies between secret discussions or decisions and public statements? How well informed was the public (i.e., attentive newspaper readers) on what actually was going on?

Extraits

[...] New York : W. W. Norton & Company, Inc - Krock, Arthur, In the Nation New York Times. Oct - Unknown journalist, Major US Decision On Policy Is Awaited; Moves Kept Secret in The Washington Post, Times Herald. Oct - Unknown journalist, A Time for Diplomacy in the New York Times. Oct Department of State, Washington, Foreign Relations of the United States (1961-1963) - Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Briefing Paper. [...]

[...] Lastly, letting people know the danger of nuclear destruction in which the US would have uselessly spread panic among people. To sum up, the US foreign policy adopted to handle the crisis was not fully explained to the media nor to the public as a consequence for several tactical, practical and psychological reasons. In both camps, the Western one and the Communist one, the handling of the crisis was mostly determined by psychology and mutual anticipations of the political leaders. [...]

[...] But from all the possibilities they evoked and all the thoughts they had in private, to what they actually said publicly and what the press eventually chose to stress and/or interpret for the public, there were many differences. Such differences can be explained by at least three factors. Firstly, negotiations and/or a US military intervention in Cuba were more likely to succeed only if they were led secretly, so that the Cubans and the Soviets would been surprised and could not immediately retaliate. [...]

[...] According to the same article, negotiations with USSR on this topic, among other things, will fairly begin “once work on the bases [in Cuba] has stopped”.[18] Thus, the Kennedy Administration really proved some duplicity in the settlement of the crisis, by concealing some facts to the American people and to the NATO for instance. It certainly did so in order to keep its prestige on the international stage and not to appear as a weak State for the American citizens. To conclude, one has to emphasize the fact that in the Cuban missile crisis case, the US foreign policy was determined by the political elite of the executive branch, as well as by the intelligence services' chiefs. [...]

[...] He insisted on the fact that if such a thing were to happen, the Soviets should in no way make this arrangement public. On the one hand, such a decision should normally stem from the Security Council of the NATO, and not from the Kennedy Administration alone. On the other hand, the Turk people would probably feel insecure and annoyed if they learned it.[17] That is why Robert Kennedy stated that the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles could only occur a few months later and provided that the Soviets remained silent on the topic. [...]