Iran's nuclear programme

Résumé du document

Diplomats, from 190 signatory countries, gather in New York this week for the five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran will surely be present. Although some warning signs had been issued by various intelligence services during the previous decade, concern over Iran's nuclear programme became widespread in August 2002, with the discovery of the Natanz installation, destined for uranium enrichment. In October 2003, an agreement was reached in Tehran, between Iran and the foreign ministers, the three 'big' members of the European Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Iran agreed to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol for intrusive inspections, and provide full information about its nuclear programme. In return, the EU-3 promised that the issue would not go before the UN Security Council and pledged to provide technology to Iran, including in the civil nuclear area. However, the IAEA later found that a report submitted by Iran, omitted references to activities involving advanced centrifuges and to the production of polonium, a material used in the making of nuclear bombs.

Extraits

[...] Therefore, spelling out an appropriate strategy to stop Iran's nuclear activities seems likely to stumble over conflicting elements. In general, commentators appear to agree on the fact that a resolutely enforced mix of sticks and carrots may work. Robert Einhorn thus suggests that Iran be confronted with a stark choice between isolation or integration in the international community. Einhorn contends that pragmatic conservatives may want to deliver material benefits to their disenchanted population and recommends that the EU and the US switch their respective roles of good cop and bad cop, as the US also has a few things to offer (end of sanctions, security guarantees)[25]. [...]

[...] There is indeed room for manoeuvre to exploit Iran's economic weaknesses: with a total population of 70 million, one-third of Iranians are reckoned to be under 14 and two- thirds under 35, inflation is at about 17 per cent, and official unemployment at 16 per cent[14]. With those grim figures, Iran's ruling mullahs may be willing to expand economic opportunities to tighten their grip on power. Another possible solution suggested by the domestic politics theory is the framing of a debate about the real necessity for Iran to hold nuclear weapons. [...]

[...] Iran's nuclear programme Based on your reading of the literature on nuclear proliferation, what would be an appropriate strategy toward Iran's alleged nuclear programme? Discuss with reference either to the policies of a particular state, international organization, or, more generally, the “international community” As diplomats from the 190 signatory countries gather in New York this week for the five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Iran will surely be present in many minds. Although some warning signs had been issued by various intelligence services during the previous decade, concern over Iran's nuclear programme became widespread in August 2002, with the discovery of the Natanz installation, destined for uranium enrichment. [...]

[...] We will draw on these three models to examine the effectiveness of the EU-3's policies and search for an appropriate response, even if the complexity of the situation renders devising a coherent approach even more difficult. This essay will argue that Iran's nuclear problem is multi-faceted and therefore calls for a response on several fronts. An effective strategy would bar Iran from playing the EU, the US and Russia against each other, while making the most of the EU's wide range of economic and political tools, placing Iran in front of clear choices. [...]

[...] 33-56 William Walker, “Nuclear order and disorder”, International Affairs 2000), p “Still failing, still defiant”, The Economist, December 11th 2004 “Russian fuel, European carrot, American stick”, The Economist, February 24th 2005 “Rafsanjani's return”, The Economist, March 12th 2005 Chronology provided by Robert J. Einhorn, transatlantic strategy on Iran's nuclear programme” Washington Quarterly 2004), pp. 22-23 High Representative for CFSP, Background on agreement on Iran's nuclear programme (15 November 2004), S0304/04 Robert J. Einhorn, Op. cit., p Ibid. European Council, EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (December 2003) William Walker, “Nuclear order and disorder”, International Affairs 2000), p Scott Sagan, do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a International Security 1996), pp. [...]