Although a full historical of the disputes between India and Pakistan and the problem of Kashmir is not necessary, it is important to remember that in the last years, the situation has greatly evolved with for instance, the nuclear tests of 1998, the Kargil War of 1999, the US-led war on terror especially in Central and South Asia. One of the major problems of the dispute is the great difference of perception that exists between Indian and Pakistani leaders, which affects their expectations and strategies. India considers Kashmir as a domestic issue whereas Pakistan sees it as an issue of "incompleteness" of its national territory. Islamabad's priority is thus to resolve the Kashmir issue first and then normalize bilateral relations, whereas New Delhi considers normalization as a prerequisite for the resolution of this dispute.
[...] - The need for normalization of bilateral relations for stability The US knows that the current situation cannot last long. The rivalry between two nuclear powers affects the security of the world. This has consequences for the national security of the US and its economic interests. India and Pakistan also acknowledge that they need stability and that is why they have engaged the “composite dialogue” since 2004 to progressively stabilize their relations. Both countries have no interest in perpetuating the risk of a nuclear conflict; they also know that this risk has a negative impact on their image in the international community. [...]
[...] - A variety of proposed strategies If the idea of non-intervention is clearly rejected, the propositions are quite different, going from a simple “mediation” to deeper involvement using facilitation through various incentives. Some experts consider that the US should limit its involvement to a simple mediation. The US should let India and Pakistan lead their “composite dialogue”, welcome any new steps toward normalization (like the creation of the bus lines, negotiations on the Sir Creek dispute resumed in 2006, or any other Confidence Building Measure or mid-level officials talks), and even propose technical assistance but on a very neutral position. [...]
[...] However, there has been some progress and the US could help, especially in the economic field. Bilateral trade has been growing and the US could use its economic assistance to promote such cooperation. The US could also play a great role in the pipeline project which would give India and Pakistan a real stake in improved relations. The problem is that US have concerns with the idea of an IPI Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (and that the current legislation even dictates American opposition: Iran-Libya Sanctions Act requires sanctions against companies investing in Iran's energy sector). [...]
[...] *Kronstadt, K. Alan, “Pakistan-US Relations” CRS Report for Congress, RL33498, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2007). *Mandelbaum, Michael, “Peace is in Progress for India-Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Op Ed, (Washington, DC/New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2004). *Schaffer, Teresita, “India-Pakistan Still Moving Forward” South Asian Monitor, (Washington, DC: CSIS, October 2005). *Tellis, Ashley J., “South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent” Policy Brief, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2005). [...]
[...] So far, US foreign policy in the region has been a success but the challenge is now to keep good relations with both “partners” while bringing them closer at the same time. Bibliography *Ahmed, Samina, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace” Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing, (Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 2006). *Ganguly, Sumit, “Will Kashmir stop India's Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, Iss.4, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2006). *Hussain, Touquir, “Peace in South Asia: the US factor” Daily Times, (Lahore, February 2004). [...]
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