To what extent is the Good Friday Agreement a safeguard for political stability and what are the alternatives for peaceful governance in Northern Ireland ?

Résumé du document

This paper will first expose the different strands of the agreement and the positions of the parties involved in the debate. Afterwards, I will analyse the most contentious aspects of the agreement, taking into account the opinion of the major parties in the debate in the wake of the recent events. Most interestingly, we will then observe some different alternatives to the Belfast agreement, considering the advantages and the drawbacks of each one

Extraits

[...] If the Good Friday Agreement was a turning point, then for many it turned the wrong way. Large sections of the Unionist community, including DUP, the UKUP, the paramilitary LVF, the Orange Order and even sections of Trimble's own Party, all interpreted the document as a route map leading to all-Irish unity.[25] Another question of the new power-sharing Assembly was whether the prevalence of moderate and centre politics could be maintained. The UUP leader David Trimble had to work extremely hard to get a majority in his party to support the Good Friday Agreement.[26] This majority has become more and more precarious and if Trimble loses even one or two of his supporters to more extreme parties, then he would no longer hold a moderate majority. [...]

[...] Smith, J. (2002). Making the peace in Ireland. London: Pearson Education; pp. 238-9 Tonge, J. (1998, reprinted 2002). Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change. 1st ed. Prentice Hall Europe. 2nd ed. Essex: Pearson Education; p O'Leary, B. (1999). Nature of the Belfast Agreement', New left Review, 233; pp. 66-96 Tonge, J. (2000). [...]

[...] The British Government was to continue to play its full part to secure a peaceful future for the people of Northern Ireland. This may be a good provisional aspect to secure transitional policing. The British intervention became necessary when the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive with effect on 14 October 2002, under allegations that a republican spy ring was operating at Stormont.[18] Senator Mitchell wrote shortly after the Good Friday Agreement his perceptions of the process and his travels across the Atlantic for 18 months.[19] He pointed out the willingness of both parties to accept Northern Ireland institutions and to work with people from all traditions. [...]

[...] The idea runs the risk of creating a segregated authority, in which the sovereign power is forced to act separately according to the area being governed. Legislation would be difficult to pass, requiring the approval of both parliaments or an executive council of representatives from both governments Repartition The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic would be moved. The size of Northern Ireland would decrease, with parts transferred to the Republic. Repartition has been successfully implemented in Europe, e.g. [...]

[...] II- Presenting the Good Friday Agreement 1 Historical background Political stability in Northern Ireland shall be understood on a large timescale. Indeed, the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 left Northern Ireland, as defined in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, within the United Kingdom. Its legislature and executive functioned under the 1920 Act provisions until in the late 1960s the advent of the 'Troubles' brought devolved government to an end.[5] Direct Rule from Westminster was imposed in 1972, and the Stormont Parliament abolished in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973, which provided for a new Assembly and a power-sharing Executive.[6] At that time, self-governance of Northern Ireland failed. [...]