The classical realist and structural realist theories applied to the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999

Résumé du document

Kosovo is mostly known as a region in the former Yugoslavia where, in 1998 and 1999, there was growing violence between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which sought independence from Serbia, and the Serbian army and police, which were randomly attacking the province of the indigenous Albanian population as a reprisal for KLA activities. In an effort to prevent further violence, in 1998, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued several ultimatums to Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslavian President, demanding that the Serbs stop violence towards the Kosovar Albanian population and withdrew military forces from the province. As the Serbs refused to give in, NATO intervened in Kosovo without asking the permission to the United Nation Security Council and launched an air campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999: the Operation Allied Force (OAF). In apparent retaliation for the NATO intervention, the Serbian army began to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its population of Albanians and the flood of Albanian refugees reached crisis proportions.

Extraits

[...] Not only did an enormous gap between US and Yugoslavian military forces exist, but NATO was also more powerful than the Yugoslavia's allies. Actually, despite several attempts, Russia couldn't manage to prevent the bombing of its Serbian ally. Furthermore, the United States deliberately bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia to prevent the Chinese government from sharing military intelligence with the Yugoslavian regime. By mid-May 1999, it appeared that neither China nor Russia was able or willing to dissuade additional NATO attacks and that Yugoslavia was too weak to compensate the vulnerability of its infrastructure and industry anymore. [...]

[...] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a weak, poor country on the periphery of Europe so the conflict in Kosovo may have posed a threat to US secondary or extrinsic interests in Europe. Indeed, Kosovo is nearby key NATO allies and there was a possibility that massive refugee flows might destabilize Europe. However, the United States did not have intrinsic, vital economic or security interests in the Balkans. Henry Kissinger also claimed that the US involvement would be too expensive and time-consuming. [...]

[...] Why did Yugoslavia collapse after the Cold War contrary to other states in Eastern Europe? Why did NATO intervene in Kosovo? What were the consequences of the intervention for Kosovo? What were the consequences for the realm of international law and international justice? I will try to answer these questions by analysing the conflict through the lens of the classical realist and structural realist approaches of international relations. I chose those theories because they are often considered as two of the predominant theoretical approaches in IR theories. [...]

[...] Similarly, in 2000, in spite of its economic and military dominance, the United States only contributed 13% of the funds used to supervise Kosovo and 20% of the troops. Moreover, the United States sometimes didn't even come to help France when violence erupted in Mitrovica. If international anarchy means that nothing can prevent the states from intervening in the affairs of the others, it also implies that nothing can compel the mighty states to do something, to face important responsibilities. [...]

[...] How do the classical realist and structural theories enlighten the Kosovo war and to what extent does the crisis illustrate those theoretical approaches? To what extent do they explain the sources, the conduct, the outcome and the consequences of the Kosovo War? Does the crisis underline limits of the theories? The classical realist and the structural realist theories illuminate some aspects of the Kosovo crisis as they help understanding the sources, the conduct, the outcome and the consequences of the war. [...]