The Sunshine Policy (1998-2008) on the Korean peninsula, a critical assessment questioning the dominant western paradigm

Résumé du document

This article criticizes the dominant Western paradigm vis-à-vis North Korea, which is often critical towards it, while Pyongyang has sometimes been able to compromise. This paper seeks to highlight the reasons why North Korea and South Korea have not achieved reunification despite the implementation of the Sunshine Policy from 1998 to 2008. It proposes to find answers to this failure. On the one hand, it looks at the domestic level with the rise of conservatism in South Korea and the immobilism of the people in North Korea. On the other hand, it looks at the reasons for this failure at the international level by mentioning the role of the United States after the election of G. W. Bush.

Extraits

[...] The first article of the treaty established that the two countries owed each other mutual respect. Other articles said that the two countries should promote economic exchanges, and also exchanges in fields such as science and technology, education or arts. It also established concreate measures such as a clause of non-aggression and the telephone hotline with the purpose, according to article 13, to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation. It seemed to transform the precarious regime created by the 1953 armistice into a state of lasting peace. [...]

[...] It impacted the Sunshine Policy and the euphoria that took place in 2001 has come down. While in 2002, polls showed excellent results in favor of the Sunshine Policy, the public was more divided in two after these incidents and conservatives and progressives faced each other in equal measure. The conservatives argued that the South Korean government was being fooled and that in fact no military improvements between North and South had taken place since the summit. They also pointed out that South Korea's assistance to the North was one-sided. [...]

[...] This does not mean that the regime of North Korea must be excused, nor one can legitimize and justify its totalitarian discourse currently in place. However, it is certain that the opposite, that is to say, to demonize North Korea permanently, is not a great intellectual help either. In the first part, I present the cultural origins of the policy and I put it in a historical perspective, which is necessary to understand the scope of the Sunshine Policy. The second part is about the staggering improvement of inter-korean relations sparking public euphoria. [...]

[...] The sunshine policy and security on the Korean peninsula: a critical assessment and prospects. Asian Perspective, 37-69 Hogarth, H. K. (2012). South Korea's sunshine policy, reciprocity and nationhood. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 99- 111. doi: 10.1163 /156914912X620761 Kim, Y. (2003). The sunshine policy and its aftermath. Korea Observer, 691-706 Kim, Y. (2013). [...]

[...] Most importantly, there is no longer going to be any war. The North will no longer attempt unification by force and at the same time we will not do any harm to the North. President Kim Dae-jung's statement caused the euphoria of the South Korean public (Yong-Sup Han, 2002). Pyongyang's criticism of Seoul dropped by 75 percent during this period and North Korea also showed great interest in resolving military conflicts with the United States under Clinton's presidency. The North sent a vice-chairman of the National Defense Committee, Cho Myong Rok, in Washington D.C., to discuss the normalization of relations between the North and the US in 2000. [...]