Occidental intelligences facing Middle East's quest for nuclear weapons: the case of Israel Vs. the case of Iran

Résumé du document

The nuclear bomb is much more than a common weapon, it can determine the balance of the powers, and it is a crucial point for understanding the international strategic relations. The nuclear bomb represents the possibility for a country to be wiped off the map. Between 1950 and 1990, it became important to replace the atomic bomb in the Cold War context. Each superpower tried to help its allies to defend themselves: it was a real nuclear arms race. This subject is closely linked to intelligence insofar as the nuclear affairs are always shrouded in mystery.

Extraits

[...] With a tactless strategy that only aroused suspicion, Israel declared alternatively it was a metallurgical research complex, a textile factory or an agricultural station to eventually admit its nuclear research purposes still for “peaceful purposes” as asserted by Ben-Gurion in December 1960.[8] In parallel, association with France became more oppressive with the election of Charles de Gaulle. Less enthusiastic about such a tight nuclear solidarity especially regarding the sensitive situation it implied toward the Arab states, the new French president set up new conditions to the cooperation. After considering merely putting a stop to the partnership with Israel, De Gaulle required in 1960 the reassertion by Israel of its nuclear program's peaceful purposes, the allowance of international inspections and a public declaration from Israeli officials of the existence of Dimona. [...]

[...] The situation was problematic since Israel needed France support and deliveries- but could not subject itself to the conditions otherwise its nuclear weapons program would have been compromised. After months of discussions, French conditions were accepted except the requested inspections but since then Israel slightly took more distance with French institutions.[9] Dimona's reactor was achieved in 1964 with a power up to three times the originally declared level (which was 24W).[10] The Negev reactor was able to transform enough plutonium for one or two weapons a year. [...]

[...] Indeed, the Americans preferred confide the revolt to the fanatic mullahs rather than to a laic left-wing opposition who were particularly related to the Soviets. President Carter favoured an anti-American system rather than a pro-Soviet one. The ayatollah Khomeini prepared the revolution from Neauphle-le- Chateau with the future president of the Islamic Republic, Bani Sadr. On the 16th of January the shah left Iran few weeks of holiday”. On the 1st of February 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini left Paris for Tehran. The Islamist had chased away the shah. [...]

[...] This negotiation was about to succeed finally failed at the last moment. After this failure, the Iranian multiplied their terrorist attacks against France in the few weeks before the elections. Within five weeks, Iran managed to put France in a terrible situation. At the beginning of April 1986, Jacques Chirac, the new French Prime Minister, sent a delegation in Iran to solve the Eurodif question. France was not presented as the Iran's enemy anymore. In June 1986, Massoud Redjavi, the leader of the Moudjahidin left “voluntarily” France. [...]

[...] They did not plan to give to the fanatic mullahs the nuclear bomb they had promised to the shah in 1974. However, as planned by Jimmy Carter, the Islamic Republic kept belonging to the western clan. The place of Iran on the world's map was not modified, neither the American interest for Iran, nor the mullah's will to escape the Soviet's domination. Thereby, from April 1980 to January 1981, Iran was subjected to an embargo about the food (meat, rice, sugar The Westerners consistently diverted this embargo. [...]