US policy towards the Taliban since the end of the cold war

Résumé du document

The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 did not provoke the fall of Najibullah's communist regime, but rather the beginning of Civil war between the different factions and ethnics. The US was officially not interested anymore in that part of the world and focused primarily in Europe. However, the USA had kept ties with the Mujaheddins who had received US support (training and ammunition) through Pakistan in 1980s. As early as 1994 and the emergence of the Taliban movement from Pakistani madrassas (in refugees camps), US diplomats recognized their interest: the Taliban and the US shared common objectives, i.e. "eliminating drugs and thugs" (narco-traffic, terrorism) and fighting against Iran. Thus it welcomed and supported through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia the victory of the Taliban in 1996. The Taliban were also considered as the best option for a stable and secure Afghanistan where American companies would invest, especially Unocal and its pipeline project (from the Caspian to Pakistan).

Extraits

[...] The US was officially not interested anymore in that part of the world and focused primarily in Europe. However, the USA had kept ties with the Mujaheddins who had received US support (training and ammunition) through Pakistan in 1980s. As early as 1994 and the emergence of the Taliban movement from Pakistani madrassas (in refugees camps), US diplomats recognized their interest: the Taliban and the US shared common objectives, i.e. “eliminating drugs and thugs” (narco-traffic, terrorism) and fighting against Iran. [...]

[...] Thus the US policies clearly lacked coherence and long term strategic programs. In the 1994-97 period, the USA were mostly interested in oil and in containing Iran, but did not take into consideration the consequences of their policies of the 1980s and of their support to uncontrolled religious extremists and sacrificed US values: human rights and ethical business. This resulted in a double failure: the short term goals were not achieved (no pipeline, Iran not defeated), and the medium term consequences are catastrophic: underdevelopment, drugs, a failed state, and terrorism. [...]

[...] In November 1997, Secretary of State Albright publicly criticized the Taliban regime, which meant the clear end of American support to them. She also promoted international action used all her influence to make Saudis and Pakistanis cease their financial and military support. The end of the Unocal project, clearly supported by the Department of State illustrated this disengagement and change of policy. After the 1998 embassies bombings, the US became clearly hostile to the Taliban and focused on Osama Bin Laden, who had received a shelter from Mullah Omar. [...]

[...] The failure of the 1999 process of reconciliation under UN auspices in Tashkent and the ambiguity of Mullah Omar, accepting to negotiate but changing his minds once the US ambassador had left, were not in favor of better US-Taliban relations. But the major factor of evolution was the link between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden was a friend of Mullah Omar, and Al Qaeda camps were located in Afghanistan. The bombing of the US embassies of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998 were organized by Bin Laden's network. [...]

[...] Those countries were, with the UAE, the only ones that recognized the regime and helped it to fight against Shia troops. In the 1997, the US were more involved in Afghanistan and supported the attempts of UN officials to promote international cooperation. The 6+2 meetings in former soviets republics could have been organized before (even if cooperation with Iran would not have been easy at that time). The US and Russia could have fostered regional cooperation with a pledge of each neighbor not to intervene in Afghanistan domestic affairs. [...]