Globalisation and peace in the twenty-first century: a structuralist approach

Résumé du document

In his Glance at today's world (1931), French poet Paul Valéry wrote "Le temps du monde fini commence" (1). By "monde fini", he meant that the world now had well-established geographical limits, implying there was no more Terra incognita or utopia where to transpose our dreams, either in reality or mentally, and that countries were to become increasingly interdependent. Problems were to become world-scale ones, which should only be dealt with on the international level, through an increased cooperation between states. At the eve of this new century, the first part of Valéry's prediction has come true. For a number of technological and political reasons, the world has come through a process of cultural and economic "globalisation" which has not yet come to an end. By "globalisation", I mean the increasing economic interdependence and the multiplication of trade and cultural relations between regions of the world that barely had any contacts a century ago. Now, trying to know if the 21st century be less conflictual than the 20th makes it necessary to examine the long-term trends of world politics, such as globalisation. Globalisation will certainly go on in the 21st century, and we need to know if it will be more a factor of peace or a factor of trouble. Many politicians, economists and IR theorists argue that globalisation is a factor of peace, arguing that increased economic interdependence cannot but lead countries to cooperate.

Extraits

[...] In his opinion, only free trade could have such a consequence. If companies were held by private individuals, if states abandoned both their protectionist trade policies and their monopoly on trade, and if liberty of the seas were implemented, incentive for economic war would eventually disappear. International competition would lead states to specialise in the field in which they have a comparative advantage over their neighbours, and their economies would become increasingly interdependent, making them less likely to cooperate. Furthermore, wealth generated by trade would benefit to all states and not to a couple of thalassocracies - and cause no jealousy or hatred. [...]

[...] Most conflicts arise in the same civilisational area. South Korea has more to fear from North Korea than from Western nations; Taiwan from China than from anyone else; both World Wars were primarily “European civil Catholic France allied with Muslim Ottoman Empire and Protestant Sweden against Catholic Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth century; the wars of religion that devastated Europe in the wake of the Reformation were actually more about territory than religion; and even the Christian crusades were not as religious-based as people ordinarily think, but rather a way for either the Pope or European Kings to reassert their power and legitimacy. [...]

[...] Indeed, they allow for more economic and political interdependence between states, but defuse the destabilising effects of free trade among their members. Some conditions have to be met for this objective to be met : - Integration international organisations should either be composed of states of the same economic level, or provide for re-distributive mechanisms (such as the Regional Development Funds in the EU) within it. In both cases, this limits the disruptive consequences of forcing poor states to enter into competition with developed ones which lead to “social dumping” from poor states and encourages them to maintain a low-cost workforce. [...]

[...] Civilisations being not represented on the international scene, what we call civilisational wars are actually interstate wars, and states basically think in terms of national interest rather than identity. The same can be said of factional groups in civil wars : as it has been previously stressed, most civil wars have an economic agenda. No state refusing the very influence of other civilisations has ever survived a long time without seriously changing his policy line. Imperialist totalitarian states have all been defeated. [...]

[...] If globalisation is no force of peace, we need to acknowledge that the countries that have stepped aside from it (voluntarily or not) generally suffered more from poverty and war than those who did. “Anti-globalisation movements” have come to acknowledge this fact and now label themselves “alter-globalisation” movements. Regulating trade Free trade being the main feature of globalisation, it is the object both of the most grandiloquent praises and harshest critiques. We have seen that trade in itself is neither a factor of peace or conflict, and that the risk for it to lead to international or interstate tensions depends on the way it is organised and regulated. [...]