In what extent and how did the making of foreign economic policy changed in the Post-Communist Russia?

Résumé du document

The end of the year 1991 signaled an unprecedented change in the history of Russia. The collapse of the USSR was not only the collapse of one régime for the establishment of another one. The beginning of the 1990s was indeed the end of an era for Russia, as well as for the whole international community. In fact, the collapse of USSR was the collapse of an entire set of ideas, conceptions, perceptions and thinking. Passing through an accelerated transition from communism to the road of the market, Russia, and its population were facing the most important event of the end of the XXth century. Insofar as the making of foreign policy is directly concerned, this period -from Gorbachev's first reforms known under the expression ?Perestroika' to Yeltsin's presidency- is undoubtedly worthy of attention from anyone studying this process of creation or building of foreign policy.

Extraits

[...] That's why we can affirm that it was the beginning of a new era insofar as the making of foreign policy is concerned, since common people were now part of the process. This development of civil society can be easily illustrated: the most striking example is probably the development of Medias, associations and clubs which aim was to produce opinions about topics dealing with any issues. This general atmosphere of 'openness' was undoubtedly affecting the way politicians were doing politic because they had to handle new concerns such as popularity or transparency. [...]

[...] As Stephen White and Stephen Revell put it forward: USSR maintained diplomatic relations with only 35 foreign states as late as the mid-1930s, which was less than half the membership of the international community at that time, but by the end of the Second World War the USSR had diplomatic relations with 52 states, and by the end of the 1980s there were formal diplomatic relations with 144 foreign states, or 85% of the global total.' (Stephen White and Stephen Revell, ‘Revolution and integration in Soviet international diplomacy 1917-1991‘, Review of International Studies). What were then the consequences of such widening of Russia's ‘diplomatic relations' concerning the basis of these relations, that is to say, their making ? Besides, and especially in the case of Russia, it's even more relevant to analyze the making of foreign policy in the specific field of economy. [...]

[...] Therefore Yeltsin made some adjustments in his foreign policy to 'to appease anti-Western domestic forces'1. This explication is enough to justify the replacement of his pro-Western foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Evgenii Primakov, 'a seasoned Soviet bureaucrat known for his anti- Western and Pro-Eastern stances‘2. Furthermore, after the first years of transition during which liberalism seemed to gather each Russian, an illiberal ideology claiming anti-Western propositions appeared (with neo- nationalist groups for example). Even though this trend is obviously not a marker of irrationality (which country hasn't its nationalist groups the reaction of Yeltsin and his cabinet -both looking for compromise and negotiation- could have after all appeared as a lack of rationality and the supremacy of feelings over thinking. [...]

[...] In a word, even if the whole civil society wasn't taking part to the making of Russian foreign policy for an obvious reason of knowledge and proficiencies, an opening occurred which brought more transparency and stimulated the participation of all in the making of foreign policy. But now all the question is to evaluate whether or not this shift meant a more effective and relevant foreign economic policy. Was it as successful as its makers affirmed it? In other words, what were -if any- the drawbacks and weaknesses of Post-Soviet foreign policy (and especially of economic Post-Soviet foreign policy) ? [...]

[...] Although this alliance seemed to promote Russia as a political leader -at least in this geographical area-, it sometimes showed its limits, especially when it comes to ruling questions since for Paul Kubicek3 for example 'Russia envision[ed] a close economic relationship between it and other CIS states, seeking to reestablish the common Soviet Economic Space'. In some extent, a form of imperialism can be here denounced. This obviously leads us to wonder how Russian foreign policy makers were managing the issue of rationality. [...]