The international intervention in Somalia 1992-1995

Nicolas L.

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The international intervention in Somalia 1992-1995

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Lecture
Résumé
Sommaire
Extraits

Résumé du document

Somalia is traditionally a pastoral and nomadic society. Throughout the precolonial era, herders of camels, cattle and sheep lived in a world of "egalitarian anarchy" where the main preoccupation of the clan families was the well-being of the herd. The clan structure functioned cohesively. Somali clans share a common ethnic and linguistic identity but distinguish from each other by lineage, history and custom. Somali society is composed of five principal clan families, the Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Rahanwein. Each clan is divided into five, or more, smaller clans which is in turn divided into sub clans. With the opening of the Suez canal and the competition among Britain, Italy and France for the control of the Horn of Africa, Somalia entered the modern world and international politics. The division and colonization of Somalia in the 1880s into areas under French, Italian and British control was artificial. None of the European powers was interested in the development or unity of Somalia. Independent and unified Somali Republic was declared on July 1, 1960. The main problem at that time was that neither colonial power had prepared the country for self-government. With no cohesive, trained civil service and no accepted political norms, individual rivalries for power quickly took their toll. From 1960 to 1969, democratic civilian government had to face a plethora of competing political parties and the dispersal of patronage on the basis of clan and personal relationships. Lacking military equipment, as early as 1964 Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for arms, and by 1968 the army has fallen under Soviet tutelage.

Sommaire

General statements and recent history.
1. Social organization and colonial era.
2. Military takeover by Siad Barre and beginning of civil war.
The United Nations Operation in Somalia: UNOSOM.
1. From reluctance to Resolution 751.
2. Inefficiency of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).
The United States intervention (UNITAF).
1. Spreading of UNITAF.
2. From UNITAF to UNOSOM II: First difficulties.
A new mandate for UNOSOM II.
1. Peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
2. Towards withdrawal.
UNOSOM I: Pursuing a traditional way of intervention.
1. A United Nations basic principle: The theory of collective security.
2. UNOSOM I: Traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI.
3. The difficulties UNOSOM faced.
UNITAF and UNOSOM II: Laboratory for the beginnings of a new interventionism.
1. The traditional principles of public international law.
2. Intervention under Chapter VII.
3. Problems raised by this new interventionism.
Compendium.
Bibliography.

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Extraits

[...] Critics of the international community emerged also to denounce the weakness of humanitarian action under UNOSOM II mandate compared to attention given to military objectives. To secure a dollar of humanitarian aid the military escort cost 10US$. For Kenneth D. Bush (Somalia: encounter of two anarchies) a peace mission is weakened when its operative field is too concise, emphasizing on the disequilibrium of UNOSOM II objectives. As Somalia represented the laboratory for the post-cold war UN interventionism, its case has dealt with consequent risk. [...]

[...] The Security Council also set a wide-ranging agenda for the UN. However, on June both the political reconciliation process and the arrangements for disarmament and demobilization were derailed when militia in South Mogadishu attacked UNOSOM II troops. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were killed and fifty-six were wounded. The USC/SNA accused UNOSOM II of partiality and claimed that it has interfered in talks among the factions US soldiers were killed on October 3. Meanwhile, there were delays in the deployment of UNOSOM II forces because of administrative, financial and logistical problems. [...]

[...] The institutions associated with constitutional governance and the administration of justice in Somalia were completely collapsed. Somalia literally assumed the status of a lawless State. It has lost most of the attributes of Statehood and sovereignty, like its capacity to exercise jurisdiction and an effective government. It had lost major capacities inherent in a State, e.g. power to make laws and treaties and maintenance of law and order. We have seen above that sovereignty was the corner-stone of the United Nations and, more generally, of the international relations system. [...]

[...] OAKLEY, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping, United States Institute of Peace Press The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, The United Nations Blue Book Series Volume VIII, Department of Public Information United Nations, New York MARIO BETTATI, Le droit d'ingérence, mutation de l'ordre international, éditions Odile Jacob The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law, edited by Helen Durham and Timothy L.H. McCormack, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Humanitarian Law Series STANLEY HOFFMANN, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, University of Notre Dame Presse, Indiana THOMAS G. WEISS, DAVID P. [...]

[...] UNOSOM II also tried to set up a politically neutral police, judicial and penal institutions respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. A new mandate for UNOSOM II 7. Peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter Although substantial progress was being made in those fields, the violent events in Mogadishu and the unwillingness of the principal Somali factions to work towards peace eroded international commitment to the tasks set for UNOSOM II by the Security Council. Many troop contributors announced troop reductions by March 1994. [...]

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