Launched with the Madrid Conference in 1991, the israeli-Palestinian peace process led to the historical handshake between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres at the White House in Washington. American president Clinton, thus sealed the signature of a statement of principles, and reaffirmed the position of his country as the privileged mediator of the two parts in conflict. Since 1991, significant progress has been accomplished.
[...] The Gulf War marked a new awakening of the diplomatic and military incapacity of Europe, qualified then of “economic giant, political dwarf and military red worm” by Horst Keller4. It is the starting point which leads to consider two urgent needs: be able to deploy military troops, but especially to affirm a coherent European diplomacy politically. Indeed, it is by the absence of unit for a diplomatic search for exit of the Koweit crisis that the EEC failed. This lack of unit is recurring in the European construction, which concern fights of influences between the European powers, like confrontations between and States. [...]
[...] This last element is relatively new, namely the essential character of the creation of contacts within the civil companies, for a viable future regional integration. Moreover, which appears constant, it is the goal shown to stabilize the Palestinian authority economically, in order to avoid the collapse of the latter. On this point, the European action was important, but the consolidation of this of Palestinian State did not go hand in hand with a substantial development of the territories under Palestinian authority. [...]
[...] It appears consequently interesting to us to consider the traditional economic and financial role of EU, precisely in its instrumental dimension in order to justify a political role increased in the area: the recent constitution of a “quartet” where EU is not marginalized any more, but integrated well into the revival of the peace process, is the most visible mark of an evolution which it is a question of recalling. The short study of the public statements after each European Council of the Heads of State and government, is clear to study the evolution of the political approach of the European Union of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, at the end of these declarations an appendix related to the peace process in the Middle East is often added. [...]
[...] That it is about the Gulf War or the peace process which is established starting from the Madrid Conference, the European Union plays a marginal part which practically confines it in an economic dimension of support, too limited to withdraw a substantial political benefit from it. But even this situation of principal economic engine of peace is disputed by the Americans. It is from this point of view at the same time complementary and concurrent influences, that it is necessary to consider the engagement of EU in the Barcelona process. [...]
[...] This European position on the status of Jerusalem, which privileges the Palestinian interpretation of resolution 242 of the UNO Security Council, will be confirmed to the European Council of Luxembourg in 1996. This Council of Luxembourg also sees the European Union reiterating his proposal to found a “Standing Committee of Security” which would institutionalize the Israeli-Palestinian co-operation in terms of Security. As for the European Council of Amsterdam (especially known for its institutional aspect), it refers to various “bases of peace”: right of the States and the people of the area [close Middle-East] to live in peace inside sure and recognized borders; the exchange “ground against peace”; the non-acceptability of the annexation of territories by the force; the respect for the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to decide on his own future. [...]
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