The Second World War (1939-1945) was won by the Great Alliance in Europe on April 8, 1945 and in Asia in September 2, 1945. The triumph of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR was however not celebrated with a widespread and unconditional enthusiasm in the victorious countries. Of course, the Axis had been defeated which was a huge military and ideological victory, but doubts existed on the capacity of the Great Alliance to keep co-operating while the common enemy had been defeated. These doubts were quiet logical as this Alliance had no ideological coherence and proved to be divided, already in the war-time, on the question of the post-war settlements. The years following the end of the war showed that these doubts were well-founded, but could have things happened differently? Was the Cold War an inevitable and direct consequence of the results of the Second World War or not? Was the break-down of war-time cooperation between the Soviet Union and its Western allies inevitable? Did Stalin think, as later did Khrushchev, that "peaceful coexistence with the West [was] possible and desirable" ?
[...] According to Hyland, the Cold War already began in 1939 when the USSR began its expansionist policy and, thanks to the victory of the USSR in World War its continuation was inevitable. Indeed, he argues that the Cold War, that he calls “Stalin's started in 1939 when Stalin and Hitler agreed, within the secret protocol of the nonaggression Pact (August 23rd, 1939), that the USSR could annex the Baltic States, Russian and Ukrainian areas of Poland, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Rumania, as well as some parts of Finland. [...]
[...] Cit., p.110. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Ob. Cit., p.92. The Cold War, William G. Hyland, Random House, New York originally published as The Cold War is Over. The second chapter of his book is entitled “Stalin's (pp. 25-41) The Cold War, Ob. Cit., Introduction. [...]
[...] War-time agreements: a “Triple Entente” for the post-war period? accidental, transitory motive but vitally important long- term interests lie at the basis of the alliance of our country, Britain, and the United States”[2], Stalin (1944) During the Second World War, and more precisely after the Barbarossa operation on June 1941, the USSR, Great Britain and, after the attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese on September 1941, the USA, began to cooperate to fight against the European forces of the Axis. [...]
[...] Fleron, Aldine Publishing Company, New York - Foreign Affairs, Origins of the Cold War, Schlesinger, XLVI (October, 1967), New York. - The Cold War, William G. Hyland, Random House, New York originally published as The Cold War is Over. The second chapter of his book is entitled “Stalin's war”. - A History of Russia, sixth edition, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Oxford University Press, New York The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, second edition, edited by Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Aldine Publishing Company, New York p.92 The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Ob. [...]
[...] Thus, it seemed inevitable to such historians that once Germany would be defeated, the divisions among the Great Alliance, which were on very important issues, would lead to a direct or indirect confrontation. The Great Alliance also split up because of mutual suspicion, especially after the collapse of the Third Reich. On one side, the United States feared that the demands of the Soviet Union to take control of Eastern Europe would be a first step towards Western Europe. As an example, the American ambassador in Moscow, Harriman, once said, in 1944, that the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbours for security; penetration of the next immediate neighbours becomes a certain time equally logical”[15]. [...]
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