Theoretical explanations of the period of peace between Japan and the USA (from 1945 onwards)

Résumé du document

On the 7th of December 1941, Japanese submarines and carrier-based planes attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, killing 3000 military personnel, and destroying a great part of the fleet. This led to a 4-years war culminating in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a milestone in human history. Japan was defeated for the first time in its history and occupied by foreigners, imposing their culture and values. Fifty years later, the same country has become one of the three major economic power, creating a brand-new growth model, has experienced years of political democratic stability and has never ceased to cultivate its independence and cultural specificity. Therefore, the country remains surprisingly neutral when it comes to international politics, which is the main reason why common wisdom has it that Japan is both an economic giant and a political waif. Only on this precise point does a strong dependence to the U.S. remain obvious, as Japanese diplomacy merely reflects and follows American positions.

Extraits

[...] Nevertheless, according to the realist analysis, there's no such thing as friendship or enmity between states, there are only common interests. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, there was no threat urgent enough for Japan to keep on bandwagoning with the US. Indeed, China was still very backward in many respects, and especially so when it came to military forces. For instance, by the end of the 1980s out of its 150 divisions were armored and the few tanks it possessed were 15 years old at the very least. [...]

[...] This resulted in the drafting of the Japanese constitution: while two committees had been set up by the Japanese government and had proposed only small changes to the 1889 Constitution, on February 4th 1946 General Douglas MacArthur set up a "constitutional assembly" of 24 westerners headed by Charles Louis Kades. This committee completed a draft in only five days. Governing Shigeru Yoshida called the radically different document "outrageous", but could no longer object when Emperor Hirohito endorsed it. With minor changes, the document became the new Constitution on November 3rd 1946. One of its most striking features is its pacifist doctrine developed in Art and which is even more binding and explicit than the elements found in the charter of the United Nations (in Art. [...]

[...] For instance, Japan has been consistently giving more than the US to third- world countries, especially Asian ones. One the one hand, it helps Japan make those countries that were annexed during World War II feel less defiant of its intentions. And on the other, it helps avoiding the growth of discontent, and legitimating the existing order. Most of all, Japan helps the USA resolve the minor conflicts arising from the claims of revisionist but weak states which are regulated by peaceful means, but also sometimes by limited resort to arms. [...]

[...] Thus, they stated that it would be a mistake for Japan to support and cooperate with the display of troops sent principally by the USA and Great Britain. On November 9th 1990, the rupture between the former allies had become clear as the JSP still refused any kind of military intervention while the Komeito and the SDP supported the project of the government that planned to enable a few small units to take part in peacekeeping operations for the United Nations on the condition that the self-defense forces wouldn't take part in them. [...]

[...] On the other hand, Gilpin's power-cycle theory seems somehow more satisfying to explain the absence of war between Japan and the USA and their renewed alliance. After its forced opening to the outside world and the Meiji revolution, Japan began to look for its rightful place in the international system. At the very beginning it seemed content enough with following the lead of the then-hegemonic power, namely Great Britain. It was a minor but satisfied power co-opted into the British hegemony. [...]