Was the NATO bombardment of Serbia legitimate?

Résumé du document

After the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians became targets of the Serb policy of "ethnic cleansing". UN requested both parties to the conflict to stop hostilities and to return to negotiations. However, peace negotiations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albanian Kosovars failed in Rambouillet in France in February 1999. Indeed, Slobodan Milosevic rejected the peace plan for Kosovo. In face of the inaction of the Security Council, NATO forces began an aerial bombing campaign against Yugoslav military targets on 23 March 1999. The campaign ended on 10 June 1999 with the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. This intervention was justified as being a humanitarian intervention against Serbia to protect Kosovar Albanians from life-threatening risks.

Extraits

[...] Examining all these criteria, we can affirm that it was rather legitimate for NATO to intervene in Kosovo: it was justified on moral grounds. Indeed, the international community could not allow atrocities to be committed anywhere. Moreover, the situation in Kosovo had the potential of spreading conflict in Europe. However, the bombardment had too many disastrous consequences on Serbia: destructions, refugees' flows . as we can see. NATO methods of intervention should have been more in conformity with its humanitarian objectives. Air bombings were not the most efficient way to halt an “ethnic cleansing” and to protect civilians. [...]

[...] Was NATO bombardment of Serbia legitimate? After the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians became targets of the Serb policy of “ethnic cleansing”. UN requested both parties to the conflict to stop hostilities and to return to negotiations. However, peace negotiations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albanian Kosovars failed in Rambouillet in France in February 1999. Indeed, Slobodan Milosevic rejected the peace plan for Kosovo. In face of the inaction of the Security Council, NATO forces began an aerial bombing campaign against Yugoslav military targets on 23 March 1999. [...]

[...] The five criteria described by V. Popovski are: - The existence of a humanitarian crisis that is to say there must be a just cause to act. - Inability or unwillingness of the domestic government to redress the crisis. - Last resort, that is to say that all non-violent means have been exhausted to resolve disputes like diplomatic negotiations, sanctions, threats . - International and internal support for intervention, that is to say support of the majority of states in the world and the people at risks - Proportionality between aims and means Let's look more precisely at each of these criteria in the case of Kosovo Can we say there was a humanitarian crisis? [...]

[...] So there were other reasons for NATO to intervene. This war was mainly an American war, supported by the European allies. So the aim of these bombings was to consolidate NATO influence in this area and to weaken Milosevic's regime, which was an obstacle for the foreign American policy. However, even if the prevention of ethnic cleansing was not the only reason to intervene, it is a just cause enough to legitimate NATO intervention, and past non intervention must not be a reason not to intervene Let's know look at the second criterion: the Inability or unwillingness of the domestic government to redress the crisis. [...]

[...] In March 1999 for example, a draft resolution submitted by Russia and Belarus to the SC to declare NATO bombardment in Serbia illegal was rejected by a majority of 12 votes. We can also state that the GA never condemned NATO's intervention, whereas it did condemn the US intervention in Grenada or Panama for example. The internal support is very difficult to measure, especially because of the Serb propaganda, led by Milosevic, which claimed that NATO air strikes led to Albanian refugees fleeing to Macedonia and Albania. [...]