What prospects for intelligence-sharing within European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)?

Résumé du document

September 11, 2001 has revealed an unprecedented threat that one could define as 'hyperterrorism'. At the time, what impressed the European observers most was the unability of the US to prevent such a violent attack from happening in its territory and European leaders swore to coordinate to anticipate such a threat in Europe and fight effectively against it. Since that period, progress has been made in the field of justice; notably through the creation of a European warrant of arrest and through the strengthening of Europol, but one realm has remained somehow, 'lagging behind' of the European intelligence. As Pierre Brochand (Director of the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure between 2002 and 2008) explains, 'Le renseignement est un des derniers prés carrés de la souveraineté des Etats-nations'. By this, he means that, still today, intelligence is one of the last exclusive competences of sovereign nation-states which are looking forward to preserving this regalian prerogative. Indeed, Intelligence Services represent the ultimate concretization of the raison d'Etat. However, even before 9/11, during the 1990s, some European governments were frustrated by their unability to provide independent assesments of developments in the Balkans based on their own intelligence, further highlighting Europe's lack of an independent intelligence collection capability to support a CFSP'.

Extraits

[...] Reasons for the difficulties and prospects for intelligence-sharing The first element which can explain the difficulties the Sitcen faces to develop is of course the enormous differences of intelligence capacities between the member-states in terms of proportion of the annual budget of the State as well as in terms of effective capacities. The Brittish MI-6 is far more influent than other intelligence services like the French DGSE or the German Bundesnachrichtendienst which are still more influential than all Eastern European countries' services combined[9] Another pregnant reason which makes nation-states reluctant to commit in further intelligence-sharing within ESDP institutions is the need for each member-state to protect its sources on foreign territories and also to respect and honor the choice of these sources to collaborate with their intelligence service rather than with another one.[10] The last major cause for this reluctance is mistrust and fear of defection. [...]

[...] What prospects for intelligence-sharing within ESDP? September has revealed an unprecedented threat that one could define as hyperterrorism At the time, what impressed the most European observers was the unability of the US to prevent such a violent attack from happening on its territory and European leaders swore to coordinate to anticipate such a threat in Europe and fight effectively against it. Since that period, progress has been made on the field of justice; notably through the creation of a European warrant of arrest and through the strengthening of EUROPOL, but one realm has remained somehow lag behind the Europe of intelligence. [...]

[...] The Military Staff does not express common positions but generates assesments of specific situations which are then transmitted to the Military Comittee and the Situation Center. The Situation Center (SITCEN) is the ESDP-body in charge of gathering the intelligence that each country's service is ready to share with every one of the today 27 member states. It is also placed under the authority of the SG/HR. All these structures show progress on the field of intelligence- sharing within the EU with a view to strengthening ESDP's independence. However, this tendency must be tempered. [...]

[...] Pierre BROCHAND, op. cit. James Igoe WALSH, Intelligence-sharing in the EU: institutions are not enough, JCMS, volume 44, p628. Walter MATTLI, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, New York pp 171-191. James Igoe WALSH, Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union, Biennal meeting of the EU studies Association, Los Angeles, April 2009. [...]

[...] But if we remain realistic and pragmatic, the most likely scenario would be for the multi-speed intelligence coordination in the European Union to progress. That is to say that the community institutions that appeared with ESDP and were supposed to gather intelligence would remain small and keep on existing in vain whereas bilateral and multi- bilateral meetings would become more and more usual. James I. Walsh thinks that an intelligence-G5 made up of UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain could become some sort of simili-unique leading actor (even if it would necessitate a more performant database and a more important reciprocal trust between these European middle powers.)[13] Conclusion: The same as it is almost impossible at short term for a country like France to give up its seat at the Security Council of the United Nations or to accept to use its nuclear arsenal to deter in an ESDP framework, I believe that a rapid European integration of intelligence remains very unlikely and that the difficulties intelligence-sharing faces are, besides, very symbolic of the general difficulty to implement efficiently the third pillar of the European Union since 1993. [...]