Critically assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism provide a more fitting explanation of European integration than neofunctionalism

Résumé du document

Drawing an analogy with the diversity of the process of European integration, Robert Schuman expressed that, ‘‘when the cooperation is still at its embryonic stage, the theorization of that unique phenomenon involves a plurality of approaches developed over time and bringing together different valid insights to the understanding of regional integration''. However, it appears among scholars that a consensus has emerged in considering the theories of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as the two main confronting paradigms.

In order to highlight those two latest paradigms, this paper will expose the main analytical characteristics of the debated theories in the first part and will focus on their application in the second part. As a matter of fact, the two theories assume a completely different view of the European integration process. The neofunctionalist approach based on the work of Ernest Haas was very influential until the early 1970s when it became increasingly contested among scholars who embraced institutionalist and intergovernmentalist theories. However, its revival starting in the early 1990s witnessed the fact that insights brought by neofunctionalism to the process of integration appeared to be still relevant, even if the prospect of designing a ‘grand theory' proposed by Haas had not been completely achieved (I,a).

The Spillover phenomenon can be considered as a central core of the neofunctionalists when it comes to understanding the process leading towards more supranational delegation. It can be described as the “way in which the deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressure for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, and greater authoritative capacity at the European level” (Rosamond, 2000: 60); it has functional, political and geographical implications (I,b). Furthermore, it appears that as the process of integration goes ahead, a transfer of allegiance of the elites responsible for the regional integration appears, and that the result of that ‘elite socialization' can be accounted as an aspect shaping the process itself (I,c).

Extraits

[...] Therefore, political integration engenders - and retroactively is engendered by - a displacement of loyalties from an original national framework towards a more regionally integrated one: “Political integration is the process whereby political players in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1968: 16). In the European case, over an extended period of time, it can be argued that elites working repetitively together with a European framework tend to develop a common set of norms, values and ideas that ultimately differ from the one of their original nation. Therefore, they would engage in shaping the integration process less influenced by their particular national interests; rather they would act according to a common understanding and shared expectations of a common European interest. d. [...]

[...] & Stubb A., (2003), The European Union, Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Basingstoke: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Oppermann K., (2008), 'Salience and sanctions: a principal-agent analysis of domestic win-sets in two-level games - the case of British European policy under the Blair government', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21/2, 179-197. Pollack M. A., (1997), ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community', International Organisations, 51/1: 99-134. Rosamond B., (2000), Theories of European Integration, New York NY: Palgrave. [...]

[...] An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, and not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states” (Moravcsik, 1993: 481 in Rosamond 2000: 137). Furthermore, he explained the steps achieved towards more integration as the result of economic groups' interests that he considered predominant over other societal groups. This particularity of preferences' formation allowed him to develop a more fitting issue-specific approach to regional integration than the framework of neofunctionalism. As a matter of fact, following that perspective, delegations achieved in regard to one particular issue are not necessarily transferred to other fields. [...]

[...] As a matter of fact, the role of institutions is more likely to be enhanced “where governments are seeking to establish advantageous positions, secure their preferences and ensure compliance from other government” (Rosamond, 2000: 144). By this method, nationals make sure that costly and risky acts or threats of non-compliance, exit or renegotiation, are avoided (Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999: 622). The result of such pooling or delegation is the creation of a principal-agent relationship between governments and institutions and: “Such relations rest upon the expectation on the part of the principal that the employed agent will use its authority according to the principal's interests. [...]

[...] Considering here the Hoffmanian dichotomy between ‘high' and ‘low' politics That dissension appears clearly in the debate between Wincott (p. 602) and Moravcsik (pp. 613-614) published within the Journal of Common Market Studies of December 1995. As amended in the Single European Act (Moravcsik, 1998: 315) In particular when one takes into account the influence of the 1985 Commission White Paper upon the process leading to the Single European Act. The inability of neofunctionalism to explain the ‘Empty Chair Crisis' of 1966 and the consecutive slow down of the integration in the 1970s can account as an illustration of that particular weakness. [...]