Does the Constitutional Treaty provide an answer to the difficulties of EU governance ?

Résumé du document

Before studying the outcome of the EU government, we must analyze the concrete difficulties faced by it. A few of the main aspects of the difficulties in EU governance may be realized from the Commission's White Paper (2001) and the 2004 report. According to the Commission, the main problems are the relationships of the EU with the citizens and the "Civil Society", and an inefficient and no-transparent lawmaking system. The Commission focuses on the visible aspect of European governance from the point of view of the governed. A look into the functioning of the EU system is also required to embrace a broad view in the difficulties of governance. There, according to the literature on the subject, the difficulties faced are related to the institutional balance of the EU, with the different sources of legitimacy. As the Member States want to keep control of the organization they have built, supranational governance is needed to reach some common objectives. EU. As a consequence, the EU has developed as a complex political system with multiple safeguards and checks and balances. The whole system thus tries to navigate between the rocks of paralysis and illegitimacy while being understandable and efficient for its citizens. EU governance and its difficulties now being clarified, it is time to answer our main question, which is as follows: is the CT providing solutions to these difficulties? This study will be conducted through the objectives of transparency, democracy and efficiency. These objectives can sometimes be overlapping or opposing to each other, but they all aim at reinforcing the legitimacy of the EU.

Extraits

[...] In this respect, using the term “Constitution” is problematic: it creates a discrepancy between the expectations linked with this symbolic word and the reality of a text which is not much more than an improved “Nice plus” Treaty. It is nothing such as the fundamental creation of a European Federation invoked by J. Fischer in May 2000. The CT does not contain essential aspects of a real Constitution such as a philosophy of government or a declaration of finalité politique. Moreover, the objective of a “ever-closer union” has been withdrawn. This discrepancy between symbol and reality makes the ratification process difficult. [...]

[...] How does the CT answer this apparent contradiction in legitimacies? I have already noticed that the CT clarifies the power of the EP by giving it nearly the powers of a classical lower-chamber, shared legislative power and control over the executive. This is clearly a step to reduce the socalled democratic deficit. However, the issue seems to be elsewhere: while powers of the EP were increasing, the participation in elections became lower; it is because the Parliament has not succeeded in representing the European demos. [...]

[...] On the positive side, it enlarges the areas tackled at the European level and makes the EU deal with policies citizens are 20 Laeken Declaration interested in and thus reinforce the effectiveness of the EU; on the negative side, this intergovernmental method of governance is contrasting with the normal functioning of the system and appears to be a way for MS to prevent the strengthening of supranationality. These elements for flexibility and differentiations la carte”, multispeed and concentric circles models (Warleigh 2002)) while paving the way for a further and deeper development of the system and its policies, contain a risk for the cohesion, transparency and democracy of the EU by challenging the original framework of the EU21. Conclusion Has the Constitution reached its objectives for a better governance? [...]

[...] This is supposed to give more coherence and continuity to the actions of the EU. However, as already studied before, this innovations are full of concerns about the repartition of power between the three Presidents and the Minister, especially on the world stage to promote Europe's new role in a globalized world”20. The issues around flexibility To ensure a European cooperation in some sensitive aspects of national sovereignty, the MS had developed at the margins of the treaties a new method of europeanization of policies called the OMC. [...]

[...] This is clearer, get down the difficulty to reach the QMV. This, added to the publicity of the debate, leaves little room for the traditional diplomatic style bargaining within the Council and actually improves the efficiency of the CM which can now be seen as a powerful upper-chamber of a Federal state. However, it can be asked whether or not the publicity of the debate will not harm efficiency to a certain extent by making the secret “package-deals” more European Commission, White paper on the European governance Commission, Report on European Governance (2003-2004) difficult. [...]