The democratic deficit and the role of the EU Parliament

Résumé du document

Since the beginning of the 90's and the end of the "permissive consensus", the democratic deficit of the European Union has increasingly become high on the agenda of scholars and decision-makers. Defined as "the growing dissonance between the essential requirements of modern democratic governments and actual conditions of EU management"(Chryssochoou 2003, 366), this democratic deficit undoubtedly shed light on the EU legitimacy. What is the nature of the problem and how can it be solved?
The main democratic criteria traditionally refer to the accountable, transparent, and representative character of the ruling political institutions as well as the support of the people (Eriksen and Fossum 2002, 401). If the parliament as a deliberative and representative political body of decision-making central is thus central to legitimate working of the EU (Gabel 2003, 290), the strength and the support of the public sphere are also strongly constituent of the democratic dynamic of such a institutional and political entity.
As pointed by Chryssochoou (2003, 366-374), the democratic deficit of the EU can be thus seen through an "institutional perspective", the lack of power of the European Parliament, and through a "socio-psychological perspective", the weakness of the support of the people. Both perspectives are actually strongly related to each other: the effective power of the Parliament improves the support of the people while this increasing support reinforces the legitimacy and the position of the legislative body.

Extraits

[...] The uncertainty of the EU public support as a correlative consequence of EP weakness It has become a common place to say that the EU was managed by administrative and political elites operating in a technocratic framework with little popular respect and control: still strongly shaped by the intergovernmental power of the European Council, the decision-making processes are indeed more prone to follow the specific interest of big business and the ideology of free market competition than a common interest based on people expectations and demands (Lodge 1989, Traxler and Schmidt 1995, all quoted by Erikson and Fossum 2002, 404). Hence it is not surprising to see through the results of a survey made Gabel a lack of trust and commitment of the public sphere towards the EU parliament. The Eurobarometer, including different questions, shows that: concerning “rely on say yes no don't know, concerning protect interest” say yes no don't know, and concerning “Change in EP role” say yes no don't know (Gabel 2003, 294-298). [...]

[...] What is the nature of the problem and how can it be solved? The main democratic criteria traditionally refer to the accountable, transparent, and representative character of the ruling political institutions as well as the support of the people (Eriksen and Fossum 2002, 401). If the parliament as a deliberative and representative political body of decision-making central is thus central to legitimate working of the EU (Gabel 2003, 290), the strength and the support of the public sphere are also strongly constituent of the democratic dynamic of such a institutional and political entity. [...]

[...] Adding to this rising legislative influence in new policy-areas, the new powers of scrutiny over the appointment of the president of the Commission and the College of Commissioners were also some signs of EU democratization. However the EU Parliament remains relatively weak. Between 2001 and 2003 for instance, only 21% of legislative acts entailed co-operation and co-decision procedures (Maurer 2003, 235). Maier downplays these figures by stating that 65% of the economic and social acts of the total) were made in this respect; he also states that the Parliament was influent in the making of binding decisions (234 on a total of 602 acts). [...]

[...] Thus reducing the “institutional” deficit can be seen as a primary precondition so that improves the EP media visibility and the EP influence on opinion formation, and thus, can be seen as a primary, if not necessary condition to reduce the “socio-psychological deficit” and promote a “European demos” (Chryssochoou 2003, 373-374). This however implies the existence and convergence of a political will among EU member states, political will which is far from emerging as soon as the national logic and sovereignty will prevail over the European popular sovereignty. References - Chryssochoou Dimitris (2002) democracy and the democratic deficit' in Michelle Cini, eds. European Union Politics. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 365- 382 - Eriksen Erik Odvvar and Fossum John Erik (2002). [...]

[...] Explaining mainly the “don't know” answers by a lack of information and political knowledge, he highlights in this respect the role of education and socialization by the different actors of the public and political spheres (Gabel 2002, 298- 300). It is true that the EP Parliament, through its legislative performance and its media visibility (Maurer 2003, 244), could be empowered to manage public opinion formation. But it also undoubtedly needs more political authority. All revolves actually around the configuration of power. [...]