CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and Non Proliferation

Résumé du document

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature and origins of threats on Europe have changed. This evolution of repartition of powers in the world led some countries to develop their defence and military capabilities, whether it concerns missiles, biological or chemical weapons, or the ultimate military achievement, nuclear weapons. These countries are considered proliferant, although the definition of proliferation remains different from one country to another. We consider in this paper, that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consists in the acquisition of ballistic missiles (by purchasing or developing them), the establishment of nuclear programmes for military purposes, and the development of biological and chemical weapons. To what extent is European Union concerned? What are the tools at the disposal of the EU, and especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? The territorial security, and specially, when it comes to military matters, is primarily a state concern. But in the European Union, member states have pooled their powers and concerns, which allow not only common actions but also common worries.

Extraits

[...] Finally, one can choose the instrument of deployment of missile defences. To sum up : denial, delegitimisation, and negation. The EU has a role for the two first options, as it has above all civilian and normative powers. The military power of the EU, although developing has not the purpose to be used as a mean of deterrence where diplomatic means and pressure can still be used. This choice is clearly the opposite of the American option, a divergence of views that was very visible last March. [...]

[...] The turning point of 2003 While the USA followed its path and strategy of military actions in Iraq, the EU, from April to December 2003, adopted a substantial number of common texts. The area of action of non proliferation is a very good example of the CFSP machinery. A European Council initiative was taken in April 2003, from which were adopted 13 Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction on 10 June 2003, together with an Action Plan calling for a European Council Declaration. [...]

[...] In December 2003 a European Security Strategy was adopted by the European Council, together with a specific EU Strategy adressing the problem of WMD proliferation and in which we shall look more deeply further. In the European Security Strategy, also named A Secure Europe in a Better World three points can be stressed. First, the first words are Europe has never been ( ) so secure With this statement, the EU wants to reassure about the security dilemma and the threats that are being faced. [...]

[...] Furthermore, there is no evidence of an international ready-to-use CBW trade. So how to evaluate the threat for the EU ? Alhtough that kind of attack is quite rare, especially for biological weapons, the EU cannot afford to ignore any possible danger. Chemical or biological weapons can be responsible not only of human casualties, but also of sabotage and disruption of the economy. The main problem is the application of biotechnology on this kind of weapons, and increasing self-sufficiency of the programmes. [...]

[...] In other words, make use of all its instruments to prevent, deter, halt, and if possible eliminate proliferation programmes that cause concern at global level EU Strategy on WMD, chapter III. Bibliography European Council, A European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in a Better World December 2003. Council of the European Union, EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction December 2003. French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for responding to new threats: the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr. Ehrhard, Hans-Georg, What model for CFSP ISS, Chaillot paper October 2002. [...]