Analyse of the European Union (EU) common Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction

Résumé du document

While globalization makes trade easier, it also makes illegal trafficking easier. As a global trade power, the EU has to against the limiting negative effects of liberalization, especially in the WMD domain. The question we must answer at the outset is: what are Weapons of Mass Destructions? Though the concept seems fuzzy, the WMD are, in actuality, are clearly defined. WMD include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. While on the one hand, these weapons do not necessarily cause mass destruction, especially in the chemical domain; on the other, massive harm can be caused by others means (radiological weapons?). On the global scene, WMD control has become a paradigm. Though a majority of states have limited their arsenal, some small countries have continued to develop a proliferation program, and supra national countries are seeing an increase of such arms. What is the EU Strategy to deal with this threat? The European agreements on WMD are not recent; but they have never been so ambitious.

Extraits

[...] November 2006. Effective non Proliferation. The Europe Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Chaillot Paper n°77. Ed ISS. April 2005. Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo. Mixing Tools Against Proliferation: the EU's Strategy for dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction. “European Foreign Affairs Review.” Vol 11. Issue 3. Autumn 2006. Reports: The Authority of the House of Lords. Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution. 13th Report of Session 2004-05 Interview of Ms Annalia Gianella by the House of Lords. [...]

[...] Accordingly, the Strategy urges Member States to coordinate their policies and export controls inside the European framework, especially with sensitive materials. Export control is a central instrument of the WMD prevention. As a result, the Council Secretariat adopted in 2004 a Peer Review system for the EU which strengthens these controls by aligning interpretations and standards, by identifying lackings and by bringing rectifications. This technique is efficient and could be exported to other fields. Moreover, all new States members must join the Nuclear Suppliers Group which promotes to unify the conditions of nuclear-related materials exports. [...]

[...] The European Strategy plans also to establish a program to support countries which are not able to control their exports. The European Commission is a permanent observer of several other arrangements, like the Zangger Committee or the Korean Peninsula Development Organisation. At last, the EU adopted the Proliferation Security Initiative to struggle against illegal trafficking. The PSI is an American initiative to interdict the movement of WMD-related material between States or Non States actors. Illegal products must be controlled, intercepted and identified. [...]

[...] The EU should also be more coherent. If multilateralism is the rule, powers of Security Council must be reinforced. The European action should depend on the United Nation's decision. Indeed, the perception of a dangerous threat is subjective. Accordingly, the EU could act and question proliferation programs only after that the UN Security Council considers a suspicious country like a real threat for global security. In the European Strategy, the Security Council is consulted only at the end of a failed process. [...]

[...] To sum up, the European Strategy seems to be a good answer to the growing threat. As we have seen with North Korea and Libya, a unilateral aggressive position is not an efficient solution. The EU is right to promote multilateralism. It is only with a global consensus that the WMD problem will be resolved. But on the long term, texts are not enough. The success of the Strategy will depend above all on the motivation of the European politicians to fight against non- proliferation. [...]