Suggest an institutional change that would reduce rent-seeking in France

Résumé du document

Economic literature emphasizes monopolies have advantage to deploy administrative expenses to the allied pressure groups, elected officials, administrations and the public, to gain their favor. Actions influence on politicians and administrations, to obtain the production of partisan regulations have led to a vast literature in particular from the Public Choice economists (J. Buchanan and Tullock G., 1962; Stigler G., 1971; Tulloch G., 1978, 1980). For G. Tullock (1980), rent-seeking results, usually by reducing the social product created by the monopoly, but, however, by an increase in resources captured by the monopoly.

Extraits

[...] What does an institutional change mean? How can we make an institutional change? Why would we reduce rent-seeking? How could we reduce it in France? I. Rent-seeking in France In the first time, we will explain some examples of rent-seeking in France, some current problem about it, why they can be seen as a threat to the society and then we will define some propositions for a better reduction of rent-seeking. First and foremost, an example of rent-seeking is when a company lobbies the government on loan subsidies, grants or tariff protection. [...]

[...] Suggest an institutional change that would reduce rent-seeking in France Economic literature emphasizes monopolies have advantage to deploy "administrative expenses" to the allied pressure groups, elected officials, administrations and the public, to gain their favor. Actions influence on politicians and administrations, to obtain the production of partisan regulations have led to a vast literature in particular from the Public Choice economists (J. Buchanan and Tullock G., 1962; Stigler G., 1971; Tulloch G 1980). For G. Tullock (1980), rent-seeking results, usually by reducing the social product created by the monopoly, but, however, by an increase in resources captured by the monopoly. [...]

[...] When there is less money, there will be less corruption and less incentive to rent-seeking as we can see in all emerging countries. Moreover, new rules have to be defined in France, more competition in the sectors where there is a rent-seeking. This can be possible by a decrease in the production of partisan regulations for a certain company which benefit directly from the lobby to the administration. It has to be thought as an incentive for innovation and investments, and so to decrease indirectly inequalities by a better redistribution of purchasing power. [...]

[...] Tax weapon is, in fact, much less efficient than the competition for redistributing purchasing power and reduce the rents. Finally, the institutional change means a change in the legislation being that institutions are generally known and consist of a norm (prescription of behavior) and sanction. In our study, that change will consist of the liberalisation of the market and so the institutions have to lead a strong active policy reforms to open the competition to different economic agents, private or public. To conclude, the best way to improve the situation is to reduce the size of government. [...]

[...] The railway must reach agreements with unions that will improve competitiveness. Not only because other modes of transportation such as carpooling, buses and airlines take it many market shares, but also because the end of its monopoly in the domestic passenger transport is now beginning. Following an agreement on the "fourth railway package", coordinated between the European Parliament and the Dutch Presidency of the Council, SNCF will open its TGV lines to competition from 2020 and its public service contract lines (TER and Intercity) from 2023. [...]